The Social Organization of Creolization

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Trying to grasp the ways cultures change, we search for illumi-
nating metaphors.[1] Ernest Gellner, in *Nations and Nationalism*
(1983:139), contrasts two ethnographic maps; but the maps
change quickly into other kinds of pictures. One of them, he says,

> resembles a painting by Kokoschka. The riot of
> diverse points of colour is such that no clear
> pattern can be discerned in any detail, though the
> picture as a whole does have one. A great
> diversity and plurality and complexity character-
> izes all distinct parts of the whole: the minute
> social groups, which are the atoms of which the
> picture is composed, have complex and
> ambiguous and multiple relations to many
> cultures; some through speech, others through
> their dominant faith, another still through a
> variant faith or set of practices, a fourth through
> administrative loyalty, and so forth.

Gellner's other map resembles Modigliani rather than Kokoschka:
very little shading, neat flat surfaces clearly separated from one
another, little ambiguity or overlap.

The first map, according to Gellner, is from before the age of
nationalism, the other 'after the principle of nationalism had done
much of its work'. The second map is one where state and culture
coincide, where an industrial economy requires mobility and
communication between individuals, and where the state,

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[1] This paper was presented in an earlier version at the Intercollegiate Seminar on
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through one way or other of controlling formal education, makes sure that suitably modular individuals are made available.

What kind of ethnographic map of the world would we actually draw now - is it really Modigliani forever after, so to speak? And everywhere?[2] Let us hear from another immigrant intellectual on the British scene, Salman Rushdie (1991: 394), explicating his most famous novel:

> *The Satanic Verses* celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs. It rejoices in mongrelization and fears the absolutism of the pure. *Mélange*, hotchpotch, a bit of this and a bit of that is *how newness enters the world*."

Kokoschka's return? If the painting cannot be quite the same as before, at least there would seem to be again, in Gellner's terms, "diversity and plurality and complexity", "ambiguous and multiple relations". Yet we realize also that Rushdie's metaphors are different - "a love-song to our mongrel selves", "I am a bastard child of history".

Long ago, a leading American anthropologist suggested that civilization was a "thing of shreds and patches" (Lowie 1920: 441), a sartorial metaphor perhaps. Since then, more often imageries have been artistic, "art-istic", as in Gellner's Kokoschka/Modigliani contrast, or in the recurrent idea of contemporary culture as a "pastiche" or "collage"; or unreflectively or, as in Rushdie's case, ironically biologistic ("hybrid" and "miscegenation" are yet other alternatives here).

Concepts of "creole" and "creolization" offer us another set of images which have come to appear intellectually attractive, as a way of sensitizing to a number of features of the cultural history of the present. It used to be that there were only some handful of historically recognized creole cultures, mostly in the plantation areas of the New World, but now we sense that "creole cultures" may be turning into more of a generic term, of wider applicability.[3]

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[2] See for example Moore's (1989) critique of Gellner's view.

[3] See for example Fabian (1978: 317), Drummond (1980), Graburn (1984: 402 ff.), Hannerz (1987, 1992a: 261 ff.) and Jackson (1989).

Some of the appeal of creolist concepts is no doubt rhetorical. In opposition to that broad and long-established current of cultural thought which emphasizes the purity, homogeneity and boundedness of cultures, and in contrast with those biologistic metaphors which Rushdie struggles to turn on their heads, creolist concepts suggest that cultural mixture is not necessarily deviant, second-rate, unworthy of attention, matter out of place. To me, at least, "creole" has connotations of creativity and of richness of expression. Creolist concepts also intimate that there is hope yet for cultural variety. Globalization need not be only a matter of far-reaching or complete homogenization; the increasing interconnectedness of the world also results in some cultural gain.[4] Again, "a bit of this and a bit of that is how newness enters the world".

But I believe we can get beyond the merely rhetorical uses, to delineate what we call creole culture more precisely, and also to understand more clearly the processes by which such culture is made. In large part, of course, creolist ideas enter cultural studies from linguistics, and so we may see that language takes a place beside biology and art in offering at least metaphorical first aid in our attempts to grasp what is going on in culture today.

Here I would say on the one hand that it is plainly not always a good idea to model one's understanding of culture too closely on that of language, and that language hardly provides us with altogether unambiguous guidance anyway; on the other hand, more specifically, that creole linguistics, in all its internal variation and controversy, has rather more to offer than the occasional resonant image, even if we will also need to proceed beyond it.

Here, what I want to do first is to sketch the characteristic features of what I take to be creole culture. Secondly, I want to inquire further into the social organization of creolization. In scope, the resulting macroanthropology of culture is perhaps not

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[4] Parkin (1993: 85), in a perceptive comment on recent conceptions of culture in creolization, seems still to think of the latter rather too much in terms of homogenization. In his version, the inequality built into the political economy of creole culture (see below) means that the local cultures of the periphery are losing the struggle with the center, or "at least are having to compromise". My point is that on its home ground, local culture is strong enough (in these adversarial terms) to force the expansive culture of the center into a compromise, and in this lies the creolization.

I am also somewhat puzzled by Parkin's suggestion that I want "our intensive ethnographies" to address "the surface, organizational mix of macro and micro and centre and periphery". I have no particular preference for surface phenomena, and I do not think creole cultural phenomena are necessarily superficial.

altogether unlike Gellner's; yet (to draw on his imagery again) the result may be rather more like the Kokoschka than the Modigliani.

Confluence and Continuum

What is at the core of the concept of creole culture, I think, is a combination of diversity, interconnectedness and innovation, in the context of global center-periphery relationships.

The diversity in question involves a mostly rather recent confluence of separate and quite different traditions; set in the global context, this tends to mean that they have their historical roots in different continents. Perhaps it needs pointing out that this does not mean that these formerly separate cultural currents in themselves have been "pure", or "homogeneous", or "bounded".[5] We are not merely pushing an outdated understanding of cultures one step back. The point is simply that they are usefully identifiable as of different derivation in the moment, or the period, of creolization. To remind ourselves of the linguistic parallel again, there are a number of English-based creole languages in the world, yet hardly anybody would seriously argue that the English language is historically pure.

The interconnectedness typically takes the shape of a relatively continuous spectrum of interacting meanings and meaningful forms, along which the various contributing historical sources of the culture are differentially visible and active.[6] The context of center-periphery relationships suggests both the spatial dimension and the fact that the creole continuum has a built-in political economy of culture. Social power and material resources, as well as prestige, tend to be matched with the spectrum of cultural forms. At one end of this continuum there is thus the culture of the center, with greater although not always unambiguous prestige, as in creolist linguistics the "Standard", the "superstratum". At the other end are the cultural forms of the farthest periphery, often in greater parochial variety. In between are, to put it simply, a variety of mixtures.

A couple of additional points need to be made about this general conception of the cultural continuum. One is that the

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[5] Friedman (1991: 104) is mistaken on this point.

[6] I realize that this is not the only social arrangement in which creole languages occur; however, it seems to be the situation in which the ideas of creolist linguistics take on the greatest appeal to those of us concerned with culture as a collective, socially distributed phenomenon.

emphasis on the characteristic political and economic context of creole culture means that despite what was suggested before about the worth and the vitality of creole culture, one should beware of taking an entirely celebratory attitude toward it. It is, after all, pervasively marked by the constraints of inequality.

The other is that the relative openness of the continuum as seen in cultural terms may be modified by social distinctions and the tendency to emblematize these through more sharply discontinuous cultural distributions. Where ethnicity channels interactions, for example, people may be more attuned to the creolizing constructions of others within their own group than to those of members of other groups, and engage in their own adoptions and adaptations of meaning and meaningful form with ethnic demarcations as an at least occasionally relevant criterion of acceptability. This may at times tend to create several coexisting continua, rather than a single, inclusive one. The idea of one creole cultural continuum must certainly often be understood as a rather oversimplified image, or a first approximative construct.[7]

In general, however, along the continuum, people are differentially and somewhat complicatedly placed or on the move among different situations, mixing, observing each other, and commenting on each other. And to repeat: the cultural processes of creolization are not merely a matter of a constant pressure from the center toward the periphery, but a more creative interplay.

A creole complex such as this, I would suggest, can be seen as variably visible and pervasive in different places, and kinds of places. By the nature of things, it is less conspicuous in the center than in the periphery, although the furthest periphery may not be the most promising observation post either; look, rather, for a site a little closer to the center.

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[7] Van Wetering (1994: 107) comes to the conclusion, entirely surprising to me, that in earlier writings, I "dismiss ethicity and embrace creolization". Coming to creolist concepts from research experience in Nigeria as I do, my supposed dismissal of the importance of ethnicity would indeed be anomalous. However, in the main article cited by van Wetering, I do write that "an analysis of Nigeria which leaves out ethnicity and ethnic cultures cannot make much sense" (1987: 550); and also that "the emphasis on ethnicity in analysing Nigerian national society contains no more than half the story" (1987: 553). This is hardly a dismissal. My argument is that cultures marked as belonging to ethnic groups are involved in the creolization process in countries like Nigeria, but that ethnicity in my analysis is primarily a fact of social organization which may or may not intrude into creolization as a general cultural process. On the view of the relationship between ethnicity and culture which I assume, see Barth's (1969) classic statement.

My own interest in creole culture was stimulated especially in connection with field work in Nigeria, and certainly creolization, in culture as in language, is particularly typical of what were colonial, and are by now more likely post-colonial, situations. In Nigeria, I was in a country invented by European conquerors in the twentieth century, and where the visions and practicalities of nation building had since then been in the minds and hands of native-born contractors, academics, newsmen, taxi drivers and soldiers, in uncertain collaboration. I was in a town which, having begun as an alien artefact around a railroad junction, went on creating and recreating itself through local comings and goings, enterprises, controversies and hopes. Literacy and a world language had been brought to the country not least by thousands of mission schools; now home-grown sects were doing Christianity their way, while Nigerian novelists and dramatists were winning international acclaim and metropolitan prizes. The popular culture scene was lively; its music had had some of its beginnings in guitar strumming in the palm wine bars of port cities, and some in the old-style praise singing for chiefs and big men.

In an instance like this, creolist concepts may be useful in putting together a coherent understanding of a national culture; probably not the kind of homogenizing, boundary-making, past-enhancing understanding that nationalists tend to prefer, but a more dispassionate mapping of the ordering of the cultural inventory. Yet we may also want to ask what are the possibilities of applying these concepts more expansively on the world scene, and examine moreover how creolization affects the center itself.

I can hardly more than hint at these possibilities here. Mostly, again, I am concerned with the overall social organization of contemporary creolization processes. I would argue that creole linguistics helps take us some of the way here, insofar as it has a built-in sociolinguistics which (perhaps with some poetic licence) I have just restated in cultural terms. In this sociological dimension creole linguistics has an advantage over the recurrent metaphors from art and biology, as well as over many other metaphors from the language domain, and it also seems to offer a more precise conception of the social ordering of cultural diversity and creativity than a term such as "syncretism". Even so, it may be that it helps us construct a type, rather than actually account for the making of creole culture.

The Production and Circulation of Culture: Four Frames

It is an understanding of that "making" I want to spell out here. My point of departure is that cultures are not themselves living beings; they are shaped and carried by people in varying social constellations, pursuing different aims. I take it as a useful approach to the complexity of cultural process to identify four organizational frames which entail different tendencies in the way that meanings and meaningful forms are produced and circulated in social relationships.[8]

These frames, I think, are easy to recognize, and allow us to account in at least a preliminary manner for a very large part of the flow of culture in the world today, whether in any more limited unit or in what we may refer to as the global ecumene. They are not to be seen in isolation from one another, however, but rather in their interplay, with varying respective strengths. What I propose to do here is to use them to map not least the spatial ordering of culture today, and in particular, the contexts of creolization.

The first of these frames, then, is that which I call *form of life*. Probably I could spend a great deal of time sorting out the affinities between this notion and, for example, that of everyday life, as employed by various writers (Lefebvre, de Certeau, Featherstone), or that of life-world, as contrasted with system by Habermas. Or I could relate it to Clifford Geertz' view of common sense, and to Bourdieu's conceptions of habitus and doxa. But merely mentioning such possible affinities will have to do here.

My main point is that cultural flow within the form of life frame is just about always massively present, because we all contribute to it merely by going about our ordinary lives. As we are around each other and observe each other, and listen to each other's running commentary on life, we take in the cultural flow of the form of life frame. It is the characteristic kind of circulation of meaning in households, work places, neighborhoods and so forth; often routinized because it results from practical adaptations to enduring circumstances. This is not only the framework of relationships of great personal intimacy, however, but also that of more or less unregulated mingling with acquaintances and strangers, not necessarily much like oneself.

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[8] The conceptualization is developed more extensively in Hannerz (1992a).

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In many of the classical field sites of anthropology, the form of life frame encompasses more or less the entire cultural process. But even as in complex societies the latter becomes more differentiated, it would seem to remain the frame of most fundamental importance. It is characterized, again, by being the not very deliberate communicative by-product of living, decentered, largely symmetrically organized in the sense that we are all more or less equally at the producing and consuming, or sending and receiving, ends. It tends to involve great repetitiveness, and while our involvements with different frames may become more variously distributed as we get older, our earliest and perhaps in no small part formative experiences tend to be in this form of life frame.

I take the *state* to be another main frame of cultural organization, referring here to the flow of meaning between the state apparatus and the people defined as subjects/citizens. This is a much more deliberate and asymmetrically organized flow than that characteristic of the form of life frame, involving a number of institutions such as media, schools, museums, or civic ritual. The *market* as a frame of cultural process encompasses commoditized culture, that which passes from buyer to seller. Here again, cultural production and distribution seems to be mostly deliberate and asymmetrically organized. If the form of life frame is present wherever human beings are together, the state and the market are also engaged in cultural management in most places in the contemporary world. The state, of course, increased its activity in this field with the coming of the ideal of the nation state, and the Modigliani-like ethnographic map that Gellner suggests would in turn be the ideal result of that activity. The market, not least the commentators on postmodernity tend to tell us, is now both commoditizing more culture and making commodities more cultural, in the sense of increasing their symbolic load over and above what are their more or less intrinsic features (especially through advertising).

The fourth frame of cultural management that I find it useful to identify is not as ubiquitous as the previous three, but I think it is one which has had a great impact on the cultural history of the present in a somewhat off-and-on fashion. I am speaking here of the *movement* frame, involving a highly deliberate although often rather decentered handling of meaning, a matter of persuasion and proselytizing, in relationships between those converted and those not yet converted. This is a frame which is perhaps not so central to an understanding of contemporary cultural creolization

(although hardly irrelevant to it), and I will not discuss it further here.

Now imagining for ourselves a more or less overall accounting of cultural process in terms of these frames, I believe we can see how different agents are involved in the management of meaning and meaningful forms, but with different motives and with varying degrees of deliberateness; with some relatively few reaching out through asymmetrical relationships to a great many others, and a much greater number on the other hand reaching through more symmetrical relationships to relatively few. There are spatial as well as temporal implications in this, and they are important to an understanding of creolization.

Creolizing the Periphery

Let us begin to work this out at the periphery. This is where center-periphery relationships are more intensely experienced and where we should consequently be able to assume that creolization processes ought to be most comprehensive; also, of course, what we may now term the periphery has the classic field sites of anthropologists.

In the terms of cultural flow, it is particularly the asymmetries of the market and state frames that create relatively unambiguous center-periphery relationships. It would seem natural to say something first about the market, widely assumed to be the prime mover in the twentieth century globalization of culture. Commoditized meaning and meaningful form are what seem most readily to diffuse across national boundaries, asymmetrically from the North American/Western European center to Africa, Asia, Oceania or Latin America. The market is expansive not only in terms of its agents trying to commoditize as much as possible, but also in terms of their selling the same thing to as many as possible, regardless of where these customers are. From this point of view, unless it is constrained, the market will try to work over great distances, and transnationally. Transportation technology, and particularly the media as specifically cultural technology, are obviously of great assistance here.

But saying this much one does not take the consumers, their tastes and their exercise of choice, much into account. Not least in order to get a sense of the construction of consumers, I wonder if we may not be better off giving some priority to an examination of cultural management within the state frame.

More successful states may paint Modiglianis together, through their cultural policies; but the view of the nation state as homogenizing on the inside and bounding toward the outside needs some scrutiny. I would argue that the peripheral state especially has a rather more multifaceted part as an agent in cultural process.

We may remind ourselves of the view of nations as "imagined communities" put forward by Benedict Anderson (1983). Anderson's perspective is similar to Gellner's, although there are some differences of emphasis. Language is taken to be the main marker of the distinctiveness of the nation, as that conception developed in European history. This, however, was specifically the written and printed language of the bourgeoisie, a dominant stratum who could draw on it to build and celebrate an identity beyond the local. Being written, this language became standardized. It was fixed in time, and while in spoken language a great many local or regional dialects could exist side by side with more or less equal authority, writing, and especially print, made one dialect dominant, subordinated others, and drew boundaries from its vantage point.

A language, it has been said, is a dialect with an army; the joke points to the interrelationship between state, nation, and language. This, it would appear, is also the linguistic metaphor for cultural organization which matches the Modigliani.

Creolist imagery seems to me to allow a more realistic, in the sense of more complete, view of variation. It takes into account the fact that the language of writing and print becomes the standard, but it does not hide the fact that the entire range of interrelated dialects may continue to be present as well. If we return to Gellner's argument that education is an important component in nation building, we can indeed see that through its control of education - and in one way or other, this is a prevalent arrangement - the state engages in the cultural construction of citizens, inculcating loyalty to that conception of the nation to which it publicly adheres, as well as an almost universally replicated set of basic skills, including literacy and numeracy.[9] On the other hand, education in the hands of especially the

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[9] It is true that state apparatuses do not always have a monopoly on education. Indigenous as well as imported (or at least externally inspired) religious agencies, for one thing, have frequently also operated in this field, with somewhat different implications for ordering the center-periphery relationships of culture. Undeniably, however, the tendency for states to reach for a greater measure of control over education, at least relative to other agencies, has been pronounced in the postcolonial period.

peripheral state also has some quite different, almost opposite implications for the ordering of culture. It is on such tendencies I want to focus attention here, with some recognizable linkage to both Bourdieu and other recent sociologists of education and culture.

Education creates differences, as it sorts and prepares people for that division of knowledge which matches a contemporary division of labor. And this division of knowledge also entails a differentiation of more general cultural orientations which would appear to be important in organizing the creole continuum.

By making education a common cultural currency, of which people can have more or less, the state both creates hierarchy and makes people differentially located within it at least partially understandable to one another.[10] And we can see that in the peripheral regions of the world, more formal education tends to be synonymous with a greater involvement with metropolitan culture, as much of the knowledge involved is shared with, and at one time or other imported from, the center.

The state, that is to say, is a transnational cultural mediator. It is involved here on a large scale in ordering the population into categories with different cultural horizons, where those with a stronger orientation toward both global and national centers are also given more power and greater prestige; and usually superior material resources as well. While the state is hardly alone in shaping this pattern of cultural distribution, it is obvious that it contributes greatly to the formation of a cultural center-periphery continuum, in the national setting and with transnational extensions. Yet this center-periphery continuum of culture needs to be further contextualized, to pin down a little more precisely both the extent and the limitations of the state as an agent of creolization, where the diffusion suggested here is combined with innovation and synthesis. We should attend to the varied ways in which the organizational frames of cultural flow may interrelate.

Nobody, anywhere, is completely shaped as a cultural being within the formal educational apparatus. Rather, people are formed continuously through their experiences in all kinds of contexts; and a great many of these contexts can be seen to belong in what I have called the form of life frame.

Accepting that the educational apparatus has a significant impact in constructing and categorizing people in contemporary

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[10] For further relevant arguments here see for example Collins (1979: 58 ff) and Gellner (1983: 26-29).

societies, then, we need to ask how this is also rather more indirectly apparent, especially in the form of life contexts where a greater part of the action is. It would seem that there is great variation in this respect. Some people, having spent more time undergoing education, are more likely to have been extensively shaped by it; as agents within the form of life frame, the most highly educated elites may thus tend to organize contexts around themselves, individually and in groups, in such a way that these contexts are fairly permeated by the competences, beliefs and values acquired through formal training. These may well be the people most directly reached from the center, through their personal networks as well as through for example their media habits.

At the periphery, they represent one end of the cultural continuum. They and their life styles are often highly visible on the national arena, and are likely to be emulated by others, to one degree or other, directly or indirectly through a kind of downward cultural trickle. They are mediators and models. Literary fiction as well as social criticism from the colonial or post-colonial periphery have long been somewhat preoccupied with such groups and individuals, immersing themselves in metropolitanism; they are, or have been, the *evolués*, the *assimilados*, the "brown sahibs", the Afro-Saxons, in Anglophone West Africa the "beentos", so called because they have been to Britain.

Yet their particular equation of cultural engagements, where meanings and symbols anchored in the state educational apparatus seem to reverberate through other frameworks of cultural organization as well, appears unusual. With its organizational bias toward large scale in the handling of meanings and symbols, the state cannot directly regulate the minutiae of cultural management in a myriad of everyday events even in parts of the range where its presence is more noticeable, and often does not do so even indirectly, through the agency of those most clearly under its influence. The fact that it offers less of the culture under its control to some people than to others, moreover, obviously does not mean that these latter will be in a more general way "uncultured", "culturally deprived"; it only means that the state has a smaller part (apart from what is involved in the homogenizing construction of the citizenry) in giving cultural content to situations along some range of that continuum the overall form of which it has taken a major part in defining.

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Thus in the lives of a great many people, some situations tend to become the free zones of other cultural currents, less immediately affected by center-periphery relationships, often drawing from local or regional traditions. These are most likely the situations of domesticity and neighborhood life, or work situations where the part of formal education is limited or negligible.

Briefly put, it is through the part of such more indigenous elements in the construction of ordinary practices and interactions not exhaustively defined by outside powers that much of the everyday life of the periphery is creolized. It is in large part here that the shift occurs from a mere diffusion of modernity to the emergence of new diversity. There is great variation here in the personal and situational equations which shape outcomes, and this - not merely the more or less officially defined hierarchy - generates the actual cultural continuum. It is by way of people's attentions to one another in situations within the form of life frame, perhaps more indirectly reflecting the currents of other frames, that meanings are most continuously and precisely constructed. Depending on patterns of social inclusion and exclusion which influence interactions and attention structures, individual cultural repertoires will furthermore include different degrees of acquaintance and familiarity with various parts of the entire cultural inventory, as stretched out along the continuum.

The main implication of the view I have sketched seems to be that the state comes in at an early point in the overall formation of the cultural continuum, but has a more limited role in actually filling out its entire space. In supplying people with different amounts of educational assets, in promoting an organization of the division of labor to no small extent around this distribution, and in thereby giving its support to one principle of cultural as well as social hierarchy, the state opens up that space to transnational influences at one end, and indicates a direction for internal processes. In the detailed working out of cultural confluences, on the other hand, its presence cannot be very strongly felt, and is less so in some situations and among some people than elsewhere.

Such a view should be directly relevant to an understanding of what actually goes on in the market frame. As the state is engaged in differentiating people through education, but constructs them more or less completely in doing so, it also has its part in constructing different kinds of consumers, with different tastes in the cultural market place. Those which we have seen to become most intensely shaped by formal schooling, taught to fix their

gaze further away, trained to interpret and enjoy imported meanings and symbolic forms, are often the most metropolis-oriented consumers; usually they have the greatest spending power as well.

The rhetoric of global homogenization by way of the market, I would suggest, draws many of its overly generalized examples from the highly visible consumption patterns of this market segment. These are the people frequenting major department stores, reading *Time* and *Newsweek* perhaps, preferring transplanted foreign fast food chains to the local street stalls, and - in good years - even flying into London or Paris for shopping safaris.

They are, of course, visible to other local people at home as well, and again, one should not ignore their importance as cultural models to other people, when it comes to consumption either. Yet these other people hardly fit into the market the same way, in terms of either cultural or other capital. It is here we must make more explicit a cultural understanding of the segmentation of the market. If there is one tendency within the market frame to homogenize and reach as widely as possible with the same goods, there is also the alternative of limiting the competition by finding a particular niche for a more specialized product. In focusing on the market as the major force of global homogenization, we are too prone to ignore this alternative. And the major way in which such niches are found, as far as the cultural market place is concerned, is presumably in the production of commodities which show a closer fit with cultural flow within the form of life frame.

Popular culture, obviously, tends to offer us our favorite, most conspicuous and appealing examples of this. The market frame, that is to say, does not only present us with the spectre of global homogenization, but also striking instances of cultural innovation thorugh creolization.

Music, art, literature, fashion, cuisine, often religion as well, come about through such processes.[11] The cultural entrepreneurs of the periphery carve out their own niche, find their own market segment, by developing a product more specifically attuned to the characteristics of their local consumers. The culture businesses of the center may have much greater material resources, but these local entrepreneurs have the advantage of knowing their

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[11] I have discussed and exemplified this in similar terms in an earlier article (Hannerz 1991: 119-120).

territory. Their particular asset is cultural competence, cultural sensibility. Through their roots in local forms of life, they sense which concerns and tastes can be translated into market shares. Quite possibly they may engage here in commoditizing culture hitherto available through the free flow within the form of life frame. Yet the meanings and symbolic forms which they draw upon tend also to be inserted into new and original combinations with organizational forms, technology and culture drawn from more distant, transnational sources.

This, it might be inserted, is looking at the creolization of the market more from the point of view of the local cultural entrepreneur. As far as the consumers are concerned, their choices among the commodities of the cultural market are not necessarily confined within a single segment, but may sometimes reflect a familiarity with a wider range within the cultural continuum through a greater spread of consumption preferences. This, too, makes the creole continuum more complex.

State and Form of Life: Additional Comments

I have tried to sketch roughly how I understand that the state and the market, by way of their interrelations with cultural process in the form of life frame, come to organize a creole continuum in the periphery of the contemporary global ecumene. A number of additional comments are no doubt called for.

To begin with, I may run the risk of granting too little to the power of national identity and nation building. It is, of course, true that like the bourgeoisies of Benedict Anderson's imagined communities, peripheral elites today want to draw boundaries, want to turn their states into distinctive nations. To the extent that Immanuel Wallerstein (eg. 1974: 347 ff.) has been concerned with culture in his world system theory, he has seen the increasing integration of the world as a force for sharpening cultural contrasts, precisely because state elites use culture for ideological purposes to distance themselves from the center and to assert their identification with the masses. Certainly there is something to this, although placing such a view next to my conception of a cultural continuum relating to education and differing cultural horizons, and combining the two, I suspect one gets the more acute sense of a Janus-faced life; the sense of a jet set searching for roots, or at least proclaiming such a search, and at the same time seeking out the bright lights of the metropolis.

In any case, the involvement of the elite in nation-building entrepreneurship is one factor that contributes to making the creole continuum something other than a simple cultural trickle-down affair. There would also be a certain kind of trickle-up of ideological appropriation from the further reaches of the periphery. It is yet another complication that insofar as culture is differentially distributed so as to correspond to a distribution of power, it can be used not only transnationally, as in the situation which for example Wallerstein has in mind, but internally as well, to represent conflict and resistance; and whatever tendency there may be for metropolitan culture to pass downward may then be opposed by the tendency from below to draw on more indigenous cultural currents, and to ridicule foreign imports. This is again part of the dynamic ambiguity of the creole cultural continuum.

Another aspect of the idea of national culture which one may want to keep in mind is that the idea of the nation-state is itself in part an item of global cultural diffusion. It encompasses a standardized inventory of forms, to be given local and contrastive, as well as culturally resonant, content.[12] This inventory may have been developed in nineteenth century Europe, but in the twentieth century it is used almost everywhere. I take this to be in large part an expression in the cultural domain of the fact that the late-starting states of the periphery are creations of the international system, built from the top down rather than from the bottom up, as it were.

Pursuing this line of thought, one might go as far as to argue that a great many state apparatuses today, as they promote messages of nationhood, are themselves creolizing local cultures; they produce new culture by inserting selected indigenous meanings and symbols into an imported matrix, to which they must in some ways be adapted. Yet this is a creolization which the state can hardly itself celebrate, but must rather define away, in its pursuit of cultural integrity and authenticity.

It is perhaps especially important to clarify some assumptions about the form of life frame. I have suggested that the state, through its educational machinery, has a large part in arranging its subject population into the structure of a creole continuum, but that the form of life frame is more important in filling in its content, to put matters perhaps somewhat inexactly. And I have

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[12] Löfgren (1989: 7 ff.) has discussed several aspects of this in his work on the making of national cultures.

also argued that it is through its interrelation with the diversity included within the form of life frame that the cultural market becomes segmented, and thus likewise an integral part of the creole continuum. Clearly I attach great significance in both these ways to the form of life frame as a source of cultural resilience and innovation in the creolization of the periphery.

For such reasons, a few words of caution are also in order. The form of life frame may be just too convenient a receptacle for a number of timeworn and somewhat dubious anthropological ideas. There is the danger that we see it as timeless and unchanging, a bottomless well of cultural tradition, an unqualified guarantee that the exotic will always be with us.

Even if we accept that the sheer massiveness and redundancy of cultural flow within this frame inevitably make it a major factor in the overall cultural equation, something the cultural administrators and entrepreneurs of state and market cannot realistically avoid grappling with, we must not disregard the fact that it, too, can change. Already before globalization became as involved in changing the hearts and minds of people directly as it has been in recent times, it could do so more indirectly by changing the material contexts to which forms of life had to adapt, as in old-style, resource-extraction colonialism.

This, obviously, is a source of historical change which has already had an irreversible impact in many places, and continues to be important, appearing forever in new guises. Moreover, the relationships between market, state, and form of life are under continuous negotiation, and the influx of meanings and meaningful forms from the former two no doubt has a long-term influence on the latter as well.

So much for the relationship between the form of life frame and time. With regard to space, there is some risk that we identify the form of life frame too closely with the local, so that the state-form of life interface is routinely taken to involve a "nation and community" problematic, and the market-form of life interface what is now very popularly described as "the global and the local". It is obviously true that much of the cultural process of the form of life frame occurs within a very limited territory; again, often the face-to-face relationships of family, work place, neighborhood. But we must take note that numerous current kinds of geographical mobility greatly increase the spaces within which some people directly, and a great many more people indirectly, are involved in the cultural processes of ordinary meeting and mingling. And such rather personally controlled, in

principle symmetrically organized media as letters, telephones, faxes, photographs and home-made videograms likewise contribute to the growth of that space. It may be that current social and cultural thought about globalization has been too preoccupied with the parts played by state and market to really observe and reflect on the proliferation of transnational linkages within the form of life frame, and their cumulative weight.

Creolization at the Center

This brings me to a few concluding comments on creolization at the center of the global ecumene, in western Europe and in North America; in places like London, Paris and New York, the new homes of people like Salman Rushdie and Ben Okri, not to speak of hundreds of thousands of more anonymous others.

The equation of cultural process, so to speak, is different here. The state frame is not, as in the periphery, involved in large-scale, systematic transnational cultural diffusion. Its major tradition as far as cultural management is concerned, is that of nation building - contributing to the Modigliani picture. In some places, only in the last couple of decades, it may have assimilated ideas of cultural welfare to more general notions of the welfare state, but any cultural policy of such orientation seems to have a way of mostly merging with that of preserving and promoting nationhood. When the state is confronted with concepts of multiculturalism, there seems to be acute intellectual and organizational embarrassment.

Here the market frame apparently is more flexible, but again by working through various and rather intricate interrelations with the form of life frame. The newcomers to the center may be seen, in part anyway, as local extensions of the periphery. Through the cultural processes there which I have already sketched, they are already creolized when they arrive, and they can be seen to be further creolized through their engagements within state, market and form of life frames in their new surroundings. But the natives are also frequently, in some way, and to a lesser extent probably, creolized: the periphery is now speaking back. To some degree, perhaps, this happens to the natives through their encounters with new work mates, neighbours, even kinspeople, in the form of life frame; but in other ways fairly effectively (although not very comprehensively) in the market place.

One way that competition in the market operates, of course, is through innovation, and this is true in the cultural market of the center as well. In recent times, one prominent source of novelties has been the periphery. This is very evident in popular culture, for example in music and in cuisine, but we see it in high culture as well, as witness, in literature, recent lists of Nobel and Booker Prize winners. Yet note that the successful cultural commodities imported from the periphery to the center are hardly the "authentic", "pure" products of the most distant periphery, freshly commoditized out of the form of life free flow of any bush village. It is much more likely something already creolized, a mixed form of the encounter between center and periphery, and thus already something with a rather greater cultural affinity to the center.

Furthermore, we should pay attention to the way market segments interrelate here. Often the cultural market of the center does not draw its novelties directly from the periphery, but from its local extension at the center, from the community markets of the newcomers. The music and the cooking of the periphery is not so seldom available in the immigrant ghetto before it moves downtown. The transnational careers of cultural commodities, we see, can go through some number of stages.[13]

So what is then the final picture, or at least that of the present, the real ethnographic present (cf. Sanjek 1991)? Not, I would suggest, the Modigliani, unless we are willing to blind ourselves to many features of contemporary culture. It could be, of course, that we really should have had Modigliani and Kokoschka get to work on a canvas together, as there may be parts of the world where the neat surfaces really are even now more clearly separated, and others which have a great deal more of the multiple relationships, the complexity, the ambiguity. Yet Kokoschka is back, and it seems that he is taking over rather more of the canvas. He seems now to be an artist for both center and periphery, although not with quite the same pattern. The art metaphor, however, takes us only so far. We need other conceptual tools to understand how the pattern is generated; to understand that the multiple, the complex, the ambiguous, the diverse is also socially organized.

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[13] For some further discussion and exemplification see Hannerz (1992b, 1993). The notion of commodity careers is inspired, of course, by Kopytoff (1986).

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