On the Genealogy of the Post-Colonial State. Lugard and Kaunda on Cooperatives and Authority in Rural Zambia[1]

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Introduction

Much of the best recent writing on African society and social change has emerged at the juncture of History and Anthropology, where an eye for charting long-term social trajectories joins forces with an ear for locally situated meaning. A central motif in the new breed of historical anthropologies concerns the knowledge/power relations of colonial regimes. By interrogating the social construction of such contested fields as gender, labor, agronomy and domesticity, fascinating continuities (and ruptures) emerge between the colonial archive of the historian, and the anthropologist's flow of events.[2]

One such realm of continua focuses on the genealogy of the African state. That Independence from colonial rule did not constitute a clean break with the past is not a new theme. But where the *dependencia*-influenced debates of the seventies underscored structural continuities in international economic bonds and domestic production relations, recent historical anthropology has concentrated on unearthing evidence of persisting forms of everyday practice and mentalities related to the constitution and exercise of power. In these studies, excavations into past discourse often link up with contemporary concerns about the crisis of 'governance' in post-colonial Africa.[3] Historical research tends to highlight the ways in which the

'culture of politics' of the no-party colonial state survived the transition to the one-party regimes of many independent African nations. From this perspective, the colonial legacy remains a crucial factor in the explanation of contemporary crises.

In most African countries, the political system has failed to tender anything like an adequate response to the downward spiraling deterioration of the material conditions of the citizenry. In the 1990s, this fact is commonly acknowledged. However, its historicist interpretation is contested by economists and political scientists who tend to assess the performance of African states in terms of a classical modernization paradigm. Instead of looking for the roots of crisis in the past, spokespeople for donor agencies and the international financial institutions (to whom most African governments are indebted beyond any hope of foreseeable solvency), place the blame for the economic crisis on the inefficiency and corruption of the contemporary state and its incumbents.

Consistent with this, the neo-liberal policies promoted by the international development institutions appear intent on dismantling all but the barest administrative functions of the African state apparatus. This is seen as a necessary prerequisite for unharnessing market forces from the stifling control of the state. Alongside economic liberalization, contemporary modernizers also demand that the 'neo-patrimonial' political clamp of the single-party system must be dissolved. This is commonly termed 'democratization.' The rhetoric of democratization commonly stresses basic human freedoms like speech and association, and the respect for human rights. In practice, the neo-liberal version of democracy is equated with a minimal package of performances associated with Western political systems. Hence, the promotion of multi-party electoral politics appears to satisfy the political conditionalities for Western aid, even when the systematic violation of the basic preconditions for political pluralism are obvious.[4]

This paper addresses the complex debate on post-coloniality and democracy via a brief excursion into the archives of Zambian political discourse. The core of the paper involves a comparison of the notions of power and authority as they appear in writings by colonial administrative theorist F.D. Lugard, and the once (and perhaps future) Zambian president Kenneth Kaunda.

Surprisingly or not, this analysis demonstrates strong threads of continuity between the thinking of these two important architects of the African state. My interest here is to provoke thought about the reasons for these similarities and to suggest some implications for current understandings of the Zambian state. But before opening the archives, a bit of historical and intellectual context.

Rural Zambia and the Rubble of Development

Anthropologist Henrietta Moore and historian Megan Vaughan have collaborated to produce a stimulating book. *Cutting Down Trees. Gender, Nutrition, and Agricultural Change in the Northern Province of Zambia, 1890-1990* is an important ouverture for rethinking colonial and post-colonial continuities in Zambia.[5] Reading this volume (or Sara Berry's *No Condition is Permanent*,[6] which mines some of the same materials), an overriding impression emerges of rural communities being endlessly buffeted about in the name of 'progress.' This takes a varied sequence of forms. The colonial period introduces labor recruitment organizations, Indirect Rule, and with it conservation regulations and the attempt to ban indigenous agricultural practices like *citemene* (slash-and-burn) cultivation. On the eve of Independence, 'development' arrives in the form of Peasant Farming Schemes, with the post-colonial state introducing tractor loans, stumping allowances and agricultural cooperative societies. Most recently, in the late 1980s and 1990s, the 'liberalization' of the economic and political systems has razed the 'developmentalist' institutions of the one-party state, launching the (re-) marginalization of much if not most of the rural population.

Parallel to these events were a set of interventions beyond the realm of production proper. These involved, above all, schools and clinics, first established as a sideline of the missionary societies, but for the most part handed over to the Zambian state after Independence whence they have gradually disintegrated. On the whole, the material impact of these interventions has been rather short-lived. In the context of Mansa District in Luapula Province where I did work in the 1980s, 'development' has tended to break and recede in sequential waves leaving piles

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of rusty rubble in its wake. Consequently, the material conditions of rural life are considerably poorer today than they were a generation ago prior to Independence. With 'liberalization,' development has returned home - assumedly - to spawn jobs on the joint European labor market. In its stead, rural peoples are being offered, if anything, 'empowerment' and 'participation' - ambiguous and volatile concepts which imply a questioning of aspects of the political status quo which the rhetoric of development simply ignored.[7]

Zambia has not been rent by general civil unrest, and the Zambian people have resorted to political violence on very rare occasions. Still, if the 1990s has taught students of African affairs anything, it is that there is a limit to everything - including the patience (or subservience) of the proverbial 'masses.' People may have learned to live with scarcity, even poverty; but the discrepancies between the imagery of 'development' and 'modernity,' and the ever-present reality of increasing marginalization has had a inestimably demoralizing and potentially destabilizing effect on rural communities.

Functionalist Nostalgia and Social Order

In many African countries, political and social instability has erupted into chaos. Against this backdrop it is not surprising that the classical sociological theme of 'social order' is seeing a revival in various arenas. As in many realms of cultural studies, Durkheim's influence on the thinking about 'social order' has been immense. In the functionalist discourse which dominated social theory from Radcliffe-Brown to Parsons and beyond, via post-classical modernization theory into the current infatuation with 'governance,' social order has generally been cast in a Durkheimian mode, as a function of 'values.' And today, amidst a growing anxiety about the deteriorating bonds of social reciprocities, and in anticipation of impending 'civilizational conflict' (à Samuel Huntington), values are once again rising up the agenda.

Within the development literature, there are two discursive arenas in which this concern appears to be particularly strong. One can be found among the pragmatic concerns connected to 'participatory' development interventions. Within this

literature, 'local values' are seen as the key to evoking motivated participation, taking responsibility, building up 'empowerment institutions,' and so on.[8] Another arena is the more theoretical discourse emanating from the 'new institutional economics.' These debates revolve around the role of 'social capital' in the consolidation of an efficient market. Here too the solution is seen to reside with the values of 'trust' and 'cooperation.'[9]

In this context, the discursive linkage between order and values often relies on a romantic nostalgia for an imagined unspoiled 'community' of primordial Africa. Norwegian anthropologist Else Skjønsberg is not alone in her sentiment that 'lost in the modernization process are not only mud huts and grass roofs, but a way of life dominated by sharing and reflection.'[10] Beneath the disruptive, 'detribalizing' forces of industrialization, commerce and westernization, is thought to reside a pristine community wrought of harmony. These sentiments live on in the (re-) emerging concern with values and social order. If only the community could be revived and nurtured-or so the logic seems to run-social order would be ensured, and empowering participation could flourish. Naturally, an historically sensitive anthropology knows better.

Since colonial times sociologists and administrators have called attention to the fissiparous nature of Zambian settlements. This view was elaborated at length by, for one, anthropologist Victor Turner who documented how Ndembu villages in northwestern Zambia were constantly splitting up, with sections breaking off to form new villages.[11] Indeed, the image that emerges from the bulk of the current scholarship on (pre-colonial) Zambian society is one of great mobility and flux, not of steadfast structures ruled by stable and enduring tradition.[12] Perhaps the most valuable insight that emerges from these historical anthropologies is that *antinomial tendencies* - expressed, for example, in commoner struggles for autonomy against royal hegemony, and in fissiparous settlement patterns - are not a result of social breakdown, or 'detribalization.' Moore and Vaughan, for example, argue convincingly that for bembaphone northeast Zambia, such tendencies are 'normal,' an aspect of the way in which these societies appear to have constituted themselves since before colonial encroachment.

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These incongruous visions of the nature of 'community' in rural Africa - of harmony on the one hand and fission on the other - bring to mind a discussion from my own fieldwork among c'Aushi-speakers in rural Mansa. One evening some weeks into my visit, I began to expound to a group of my neighbors on the virtues of the Aushi 'clan' - for many the basis of 'community' in rural Africa.

> *Me*: 'The extended family based on clan and kinship is so wonderful and inclusive; strong social bonds, belonging, cohesion. We in the West have lost this.'
>
> *'Mwape'*: 'This may be so, but for us, the clan is not about harmony and shared values, but about struggle and dispute. *The clan is that group of people <u>with whom</u> we are fated to struggle for our survival.'*

From Mwape's perspective, clan and lineage membership implies continual struggle for meager resources, for positions of prestige, for power, for all the things worthwhile in life. And, symptomatically, at least in Aushiland, witchcraft accusations invariably involve fellow clanspeople.

This discussion was a real eye-opener, and exorcised many of the romantic notions I might have harbored about the 'harmonious community' of the Aushi. Yet, something was still missing. In an immediate, empirical sense, there was no denying that 'communities' do exist -my field experience showed me that people do represent significant aspects of their meaningful social action in terms of solidarity and reciprocity, basic values of inclusiveness. It is very hard to see an Aushi village as a compendium of atomized, voluntarist individuals. The question would thus seem to be: how are we to deal with these two images - of a value-glued cohesion, on the one hand, and of antinomiality on the other. Can both be grasped in a coherent picture which does not resort to the distorting imagery of breakdown and detribalization?

Part of the difficulty that social scientists have in holding these conflicting images in focus derives from our methodological heritage. The theoretical element that links values to social order is that of *authority*, and it is in attempts to think about authority and its constitution in the African context that social theory is at its fuzziest. Here it is more the specter of Max Weber than the spirit of Durkheim that hovers in the wings.

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According to the functionalist reading of Weber, a breakdown in social order is above all a rupture in the normative - one could also say 'moral' - foundations of authority, of what is considered to be *legitimate* rule. This view - which might be termed 'normative functionalist' - is so deeply ingrained in the popular discourse on African politics that it seems almost common-sensical. But it has troublesome implications. Implicit in this perspective is the notion that legitimate authority does indeed have *a* moral foundation, and that it is this value-base which lends validity and compellingness to a regime. But when you think about it, such a notion of political authority drains all the efficacy out of the *bios politika*. Political actors-voters, clients, members of an local organization-appear as mere instruments of an underlying normative structure. As Talcott Parsons put it with such neat finality: internalized values determine social action. In this view, it is values which ultimately determine the nature of the social order to which people acquiesce, and not their individual and collective agency.

Within academic literature, the discussion of authority and local politics is naturally far more nuanced.[13] Yet, I want to argue here that 'normative functionalism' constitutes a 'official' ideology of authority in the analysis of African politics. In what follows, I will attempt to substantiate this claim for Zambia. To this end, then, I have dipped into the colonial and post-colonial archives of Zambian political discourse for a look at the genealogy of the notion of 'authority' in rural Zambia.

A Genealogy of 'Authority': From Indirect Rule to Zambian Humanism

I have chose two political documents for discussion - one, a little known text by the colonial arch-administrator Lord F.D. Lugard, and the other the magnum opus of Zambian founding father Kenneth Kaunda. Both of these documents highlight the importance of a particular form of institution - the agricultural cooperative - which is seen as central to the progress (development) of rural society. By comparing Lugard's and Kaunda's views - which span 40 years of colonial rule and the transition to post-colonial society-continuities and ruptures emerge which I find very stimulating for re- (or un-)thinking the problem of 'social order' in contemporary Africa.

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Indirect Rule

Cooperative institutions were introduced in colonial Zambia in 1914, by white settler farmers and for their exclusive benefit. The ideological pedigree underlying the promotion of cooperative institutions for 'rural development' can be traced to progressive administrative theorists within the British Colonial Office for whom the fundamental rationale of colonialism was its 'civilizing mission' in primitive Africa. Enlightenment idealism merged with imperial pragmatism in the motives of these colonial strategists, and among their other experiments in civilization, the experience of consumer cooperatives among the urban poor in 19th century Britain was exported to colonial Africa. Cooperatives were introduced both as a model for social progress, and as a justification for subjugating traditional authority to the administrative needs of British rule. These aims merged under the auspices of an administrative model known as 'Indirect Rule.'

Lord Lugard, the author of my first document, is known as the main architect (along with Lord Donald Cameron) of Indirect Rule in British colonial Africa. Indirect Rule was introduced into British Africa in the 1920s and 1930s, first in Nigeria. It came to Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) gradually between 1927 and 1936. Indirect Rule has been defined as a system by which the custodial (tutelary) power recognises indigenous political institutions 'and assists them to adapt themselves to the functions of local government.'[14] In practice, Indirect Rule meant absorbing 'local chiefs' into the colonial administration and giving them certain regulatory powers (such as tax collection, holding local courts, etc.).

Lugard, writing from this perspective, provides an explicit articulation of the thinking underlying early concepts of 'African cooperatives'. In his introduction to C.F. Strickland's *Cooperation for Africa* (1933), Lugard represents rural cooperatives as a logical and essential component of Indirect Rule. Indeed, Lugard suggests that the system of indirect rule 'could be better named "co-operative rule" - the essential aim of both being to teach personal responsibility and initiative.' Lugard waxes eloquent on this theme:

> Nowhere more than in Africa among a people too prone to act on the instinct of the mob without individual thought,

and too prone to indiscriminate imitation, can the principle of deliberate and organized cooperation towards a definite and recognized objective be of greater value. The immemorial social systems of Africa are, as we all know, in danger of complete disintegration to-day as a result of the contact with 'Western civilization': systems which amidst the tribal conflicts of the past succeeded in maintaining unity in the community, provision for the old and disabled and obedience to the tribal laws - whether based on religion and superstition or on tradition and custom - which have now lost their compelling force.[15]

The pivotal assumption upon which Lugard's apology for Indirect Rule and cooperative organizations rests in that the communal sociology of tribal Africa had been dealt a death-blow by its exposure to Western civilization. For Lugard this implied the undermining of social order itself. It was a common thesis among an influential corps of colonial intellectuals - administrators, missionaries, and anthropologists - that 'detribalization' had left the African in normative limbo for which the introduction of Christianity and other 'world religions' was only a partial and incomplete solution.[16] Lugard clearly conveys the thought that the foremost concern in the minds of the enlightened bureaucrats of British imperialism was the maintenance of social order in Africa. Colonial conquest was seen to have eroded the political authority of traditional chiefs, while the differentiation of political, economic and religious leadership had further demeaned the scope of customary rule. Economic upheavals - most notably, the sudden and massive incidence of migratory labor to towns, mines and plantations - was seen as having split apart primordial domestic units and communities, casting large sections of the population into situations for which they had no moral guidelines.[17]

Most threatening to social order, from the perspective of the colonial administrator, was 'the large illiterate class which by prolonged contact with alien races has learnt a new individualism without its necessary restraints and a license which strikes at the very root of communal sociology.'[18] This is where cooperatives came in. Cooperatives were to act as a vehicle for cultivating a new mode of *individual modernity* among the illiterate mob of African villagers. This process of

modernization (civilization) was not to be based on the 'unrestrained individualism' that results from the disintegration of traditional norms, nor on blind obedience to tribal authority grounded in superstition and custom. The task of the colonial administrator, through the political structures of indirect rule, and the economic incentives of cooperative societies was to engineer the transformation of 'the communal motive [as it] gradually gives place to individual responsibility and personal initiative'. Thus, the benefits associated with the multiplication of small cooperative societies should not be thought of as 'confined to the economic sphere but including every phase of social and moral welfare.'[19]

Normative struggle and authority

It is important to recall the political context of this discourse. The colonial government of Northern Rhodesia was charged with the administration of a vast expanse of territory. Colonial officials and functionaries never amounted to more than a minuscule fraction of the total population, nor were their administrations endowed with large budgets and massive firepower with which to impose their rule. Not surprisingly, colonial discourse was obsessed with the problem of order.

One crucial facet of colonial administration was the shoring up of a system of 'customary law' by which the behavior of local populations could be controlled through the medium of 'traditional leaders'. The codification of a canon of customary law to be administered by a network of Native Administrations comprised the foundation upon which Lugard's system of Indirect Rule was erected. Under indirect rule, colonial governments vested Native Authorities - incorporating the chiefs, headmen and associated positions of the 'tribal system' - with the power to police and punish infringements of domestic order with relative autonomy.[20] In rhetoric, customary law was represented as the formal recognition by the colonial government of the 'immemorial' principles by which traditional leaders had always governed. In practice, as Martin Chanock has argued, customary law was not 'customary', but rather the negotiated product of a colonial encounter between European administrators and African leaders.[21] Customary law was an 'idealisation of the past' via which both chiefs and colonial officers sought to promote their own interests in the establishment and maintenance of a new order of political and economic control on

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the spatially dispersed and independent populations of rural Zambia. Thus anthropologically sensitive historians like Chanock, Sally Falk Moore, Megan Vaughan and the Comaroffs advise us to view with great skepticism any representations of precolonial African society couched in terms of a homogenous tribal community.

Vaughan and Moore also argue forcefully against a 'functionalist' understanding of the history of Bemba-speaking peoples of northeastern Zambia. Instead of the hierarchical and centralized political units enshrined in structuralist-functionalist anthropology, Moore and Vaughan suggest that Bemba society was spatially dispersed and politically fluid, that 'the interests of chiefs and commoners were far from identical.'[22] On the contrary, everyday life among the babemba in pre-colonial times was characterized by struggles and negotiations among various parties over access and control to labor and other resources.

Chanock similarly criticizes colonial representations of Zambian society for their misconstrued emphasis on the historical continuity of 'traditional' political systems. Instead, he portrays the formulation of customary law as:

> part of a process of *legalisation*, of a *transformation* in African institutions rather than a continuity. This has been a most important transformation: one, it might be said, of the hidden effects of colonialism, and one which continues to develop in the post-colonial era.[23]

This legalization of African institutions thus became 'a new way of conceptualizing relationships and powers and a weapon within African communities which were undergoing basic economic changes, many of which were interpreted and fought over by those involved in moral terms.'[24] In stark contrast to the functionalist notion of values as the blind determinants of action, Chanock portrays values as both the means and the object of contestation, or as it might be termed, of 'normative struggle.'

The political manipulations of indirect rule and the arbitrary codification of 'customary law' thus represented a concerted attempt by colonial administrators to reconstruct the normative foundations of social order in African society. This new social

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order was to resurrect the lost value-rationality of 'tribal society' - a harmonious and stable system of communal bonds grounded in chiefly authority (albeit in modernized form) - enhanced by the 'Western' virtues of entrepreneurial initiative and personal responsibility.

The administrative problem was of how to get the new social order to take root. Alongside the Native Authorities, schools - both mission- and government-run -were considered the major conduits of the new legalized normative regime. Lugard expresses the hope that as village headmen and village schoolteachers, 'educated Africans' would promote a new social order based on modern values.[25] Yet the colonial administrators realized that the compellingness of modern normativity was potentially greater if linked everyday life through a system of material incentives. Agricultural cooperatives were thus a doubly attractive instrument of civilization. In facilitating the development of native agriculture, they would allow for peasants to remain in their communities and not be forced onto the socially disruptive circuit of migratory labor. By participating in cooperative institutions, the illiterate class would be indoctrinated into the formal normative code of 'cooperative principles'.

Zambian Humanism

The development of a cooperative sector in rural Northern Rhodesia achieved only modest proportions under colonial rule. The main obstacle was not so much the 'complete disintegration of tribal society,' as an aggressive opposition to competition from African agriculture on the part of white settler farmers. Despite settler resistance, however, after the Second Word War, the colonial administration began to adopt a developmentalist strategy in many 'backwater' rural districts. This was in part a consequence of a brief period of Fabian socialist influence in the Colonial Office following the second World War; and partially a reaction to rural unrest fomented by opposition to the Central African Federation.[26] Throughout the 'fifties, Northern Rhodesian and Federation funds were channeled into cooperative and related rural development projects for the African population. Colonial developmentalism proved ineffectual in the face of rising anti-colonialist sentiments,

however. By the early 1960s the tide had turned against the colonial regime.[27]

Zambian independence from colonialism in 1964 changed the basic configuration of political power. Colonial Northern Rhodesia had profited substantially from the copper industry, but the lion's-share of the proceeds had benefited foreign investors and the European settler community. Supporters of the victorious United National Independence Party led by Kenneth Kaunda were eager to see the national wealth redistributed among the African population. The broad program of social reforms launched by the UNIP government and the subsequent nationalization between 1968 and 1970 of the main pillars of the economy, including the copper industry, effected sweeping changes in both the ideology and practice of 'development'. Yet some important continuities in official thinking about rural society and culture survived the transition from the colonial to the post-colonial state. For evidence of these continuities, we turn to the political philosophy of Kenneth Kaunda, the newly elected president of independent Zambia. Kaunda formulated his developmental vision for the new nation of Zambia under the rubric of 'Zambian Humanism.'[28]

Over the years, Humanism has been discussed at length by political analysts and commentators. The bulk of the critical discourse has focused on assessing the success of the doctrine in the achievement of its self-assigned goals of national unity and the promotion of a society based on egalitarian ideals. Gertzel, Baylies and Szeftel express the prevailing view that 'the ability of Humanism to provide an ideological basis for action and a cohesive and coherent direction for development was, however, inhibited by its own weaknesses,' its 'contradictions and ambiguities.'[29]

I am not primarily interested here in whether Humanism was a sincere attempt at laying the foundations for a just society, or merely an ideological smokescreen for the hegemonic aspirations of a self-interested political elite.[30] Instead, I have tried to listen to what Kaunda's text actually says about the 'culture of politics' in late 20th century Zambia.[31] For such a reading, ambiguities and contradictions are not necessarily weaknesses, but can be important clues to unresolved tensions between competing normative models.

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Not unlike Lugard's vision a generation earlier, Kaunda's doctrine of Zambian Humanism is grounded in a notion of 'development' as the restoring of a 'cooperative' way of life, and hence, of cooperative institutions to the center of society. 'We should recall that from the cradle to the grave most Zambian people of old lived in the co-operative way.'[32] Where Lugard equated Indirect Rule with a social order based in rural co-operatives, Kaunda insists that: 'While dealing with the issue of co-operatives it should be pointed out that in many ways the development of humanism in Zambia will depend on how successful we are in organizing people's co-operatives.'[33] Like Lugard and his contemporaries, Kaunda was explicitly involved in the normative reconstruction of Zambian history and society as a basis for a new social order. In his own words,

> I have great faith in the power of ideologies to condition people's thinking, *to mould their value system*. That is precisely why we have devoted so much time to the formulation and propagation of our own ideology - Humanism.[34]

The Humanist model of development invokes continuity with the past; putting central emphasis on the reconstitution of social order (the 'remoulding' of society) on the basis of a romantic idealization of rural history. The central theme is how to once again achieve the 'Man-centered' society of the (pre-colonial) past in the present conditions. Kaunda formulates the basic issue of political philosophy confronting his regime as that of how the values of traditional community might be retained in a society which is characterized by the transition to a money economy based on exchange, a concomitant process of economic and professional specialization which, in turn, begets divergent social interests.

Thus Kaunda asks,
> How does an individual in Zambia today remain mutual aid society minded and at the same time function in a society that is emerging from a so-called modern economy which has been born out of capitalism?[35]

In Kaunda's representation, the traditional community of pre-colonial Zambia was a 'mutual aid society.'

It was organised to satisfy the basic human needs of all its members and, therefore, individualism was discouraged. Most resources, such as land, might be communally owned and administered by chiefs and village headmen for the benefit of everyone.[36]

While these traits 'are now part of the African psychology', a social and political order of this sort that is 'tight and effective' requires firm leadership.

This, of course, did not come about by making high sounding declarations in the form of ideologies, etc. It came about by a carefully worked out order and discipline which everybody in society was required to follow. The political guidance of specialized leaders is thus crucial to a 'mutual aid society.'[37]

And elsewhere, Kaunda notes that

Obviously, social harmony was a vital necessity in such a community where almost every activity was a matter of team work. Hence, chiefs and traditional elders had an important judicial and reconciliatory function. They adjudicated between conflicting parties, admonished the quarrelsome and the anti-social and took whatever action was necessary to strengthen the fabric of social life.[38]

Kaunda's treatise originated in the period of anti-colonial struggle. Its central premises were already articulated before independence before being made public in 1965.[39] The obsession of Zambian Humanism with reconstructing the traditional community as 'a strange mixture of nineteenth century capitalism with communism,' expresses an ideological amalgamate of many sources and influences.[40] It also reflects an attempt both to 'remould' rural self-conceptions by recreating history in such a way that a harmonious past of the locality flows effortlessly into a hegemonous future of centralized state control. Thus, for the Humanist, 'the modern State...is actually a development of the ancient village-state...This increasing enlargement of Man's togetherness is both right and inevitable.' [41]

The author(s) of Humanism were involved in a conscious effort to (re)create a framework of substantive values for Zambian society after the humiliation of colonial subjugation. In constructing this normative platform, Zambian ideologues were

obviously involved in a travail of modern 'nation-building.'[42] Kaunda's dilemma was to disassociate 'modernity' as a measure of progress from its racialist colonial context.

Even more importantly, the ideological constitution of the Zambian nation-state implied the justification of a national authority which could claim supremacy to local rule. But the defusing of localist and regionalist oppositions to the nationalist project also demanded the representation of a normative continuity between the bases of local authority and the political foundations of the State. It was therefore essential that the doctrine of Zambian Humanism could portray the nationalist project as 'co-operative', while at the same time representing the basic fabric of 'traditional community' as a 'mutual-aid society'. In extrapolating 'mutual-aid' from the domain of the community to that of the nation, the normative substance of 'co-operation' was decontextualized. It no longer referred to rights and obligations embedded in the personalized social matrices of a small-scale rural community. Instead, the normative bases of 'co-operation' became universalized - in a sense, transcendental. The morality of mutual aid derives no longer from the 'communal sociology'; in the Humanist framework, 'co-operation' is grounded in the universal normative realm of world religion and philosophy.

Zambian historian Samuel Chipungu sees the central tension in Humanist ideology and policy as between socialist promulgation about the desirability of a classless society and concrete efforts, initiated by localized elites, at fomenting social differentiation, especially in rural areas.[43] Yet this should not be read as the State saying one thing and doing another. Rather, this tension might be best understood as reflecting a struggle within the state, and within Zambian society as a whole, between the bureaucratic *regulation* and that of localized, antinomial self-determination. Indicative of this structural tension is the way in which practices of 'development' -represented initially as a vehicle for the liberation from the constraints of nature, ignorance and poverty- increasingly become an instrument of control.

According to Lugard, contact with the west unraveled the moral fabric of 'tribal society.' For Kaunda the ordeal of political, economic and cultural colonization is not characterized as

breakdown, but as *trauma*.[44] The normative foundations of the precolonial social order were challenged, not only by force but in moral terms. African culture was declared inferior to European culture; the very humanity of the African population was openly and systematically challenged from positions of great prestige and authority in colonial society, including representatives of the Anglican Church. As a therapeutic discourse, Humanism deconstructs and subsumes European sensibilities within a new discourse of dignity and self-respect. By incorporating Christian moral rhetoric in the Humanist canon, Kaunda 'digests'[45] the colonial discourse on moral standards, thus turning the tables on racist ideologues of colonialism. But this digestion leads Kaunda to further essentialize the nature of authority in metaphysical terms. Thus, in a later text, the State emerges as the embodiment of normative order beyond the profane realm of human interests: 'In the institution of the State, Man is confronted with power in the most absolute sense that can be known on earth. . . . the State is not the source of power, it merely mediates power derived from God.'[46]

Continuity (and Rupture)

What unites Lugard and Kaunda in their discussion of authority in rural society is their common ground in a normative functionalism. Both see their task as administrators of 'social progress' in facilitating the consolidation of a value-base commensurate with the legitimacy of their rule. 'Get the values right and the rest will follow' could be their common anthem. Clearly, Lugard and Kaunda both lack a notion of normative struggle as an intrinsic feature of the social order. Authority is grounded in a normative structure shared by all but 'the quarrelsome and the anti-social.' By the same token, both authors describe social change as a linear process of the liberal (modern) political institutions coming to fruition. For Kaunda this is a political task, and he is confident about its success. Lugard's discourse is less self-assured: he also entertains the possibility of a reversion to disorder, the antithesis of progress. In both cases, normative functionalist thought is blind to the role of *antinomial tendencies* as a structural feature of social process. The possibility of fission, of countervailing loyalties within the prescribed institutional framework does not arise.

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Looking for the sources of this common mind-set, one obvious candidate is the moralizing frame of analysis espoused by the Fabian socialist movement. By 1933, when Lugard was expressing his views on 'cooperative rule', he was already established in the Fabian Society in London.[47] Kaunda was probably also exposed to Fabian ideas from a number of sources. I am not aware of any direct dealings between Kaunda and the Fabianists, but Fabian trade union organizers were active on the Zambian Copperbelt in the early days of Kaunda's career there as a political organizer, and the Fabianists cultivated close ties to many leaders of the nationalist movements throughout Africa in the 1950s. The strong possibility of an immediate historical link between these two political theorists is thus plausible.

Perhaps the commonalities between these two men are the simple consequence of a shared socialist idealism. Be this as it may, there is another type of historical continuity at work here as well. Lugard and Kaunda, each in their own way and context, were both confronted with the dilemma of establishing the hegemony of an integrative, aggregate, super-local structure (the state) on a political terrain in which antinomial tensions have a constitutive presence. The imperatives of this fact -of containing the ideological niche of localist antimony- engendered both the no-party state of the colonial regime, and the one-party state of post-colonial Zambia. It is this historical task which is inscribed in the tenants of normative functionalism. Consider, for example, Richard Hilbert's recent portrayal of functionalism as the ideology of 'the rational-legal realm of modern society' - or, to put it another way, as the view from the centralized state. Lugard and Kaunda were both intently engaged in what Chanock called the *'legalisation'* of the rural social order. In Hilbert's words, functionalism is 'both an expression and a part of a "bureaucratic model" of society, intent upon the *rationalization of the collective conscience.'*[48] Functionalism gives expression to 'a social universe that respects rules and believes in their necessity and their potential adequacy.'[49]

Across the *ruptures* of race, and a political legitimacy grounded in deep popular support, Kaunda inherited the rhetoric and apparatus of a 'modernizing state.' The intrinsically 'developmental' aspect of late colonial policy was further enhanced by the Federation with its fantasy of a locally controlled apartheid economy. Via Humanism, Kaunda took

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this vision and transformed it into a *nationalist* ideology -taut with the internal tension of building on the colonial vision of modernity while injecting political distance from the humilities of the colonial endeavor. The resolution of this tension is found in the national, collectivist project of 'state-building,' for which 'cooperation' provides the star metaphor.

The policy of modernization of Zambia's First and Second Republics was thus directly linked to the idea of a unified nation.[50] The policy of the UNIP party-state sought to unite the localized Native Authorities created under Indirect Rule in accordance with the predominant slogan of 'One Zambia, One Nation.' This national modernization project both required and legitimated the party-state, and one of its key rhetorical devices involved the distributionist theme of reconciling urban-rural discrepancies. Rural marketing cooperatives symbolized the resource flows through which this work of national modernization was to transpire. Twice - first immediately after Independence, and again from the late 1970s on, the Zambian government mobilized immense sums of money in order to promote rural development through agricultural modernization and the establishment of primary cooperative societies in each of Zambia's rural wards.

Cooperatives, Democracy and Social (Dis)Order

For various reasons, colonial and post-colonial leaders consistently misconstrued the 'plug and play' capacity of cooperative institutions as vehicles for directed social change. Neither the colonial nor the post-colonial state made great inroads in establishing value-hegemony at the community level, and cooperatives were no more successful in this than in their more specifically economic functions. Indeed, from the financial perspective, 'cooperative development' has been a repetitious series of fiascoes. This was true of the rise and fall of cooperatives in the 1960s (as discussed by Lombard, Bates and Bratton, among others),[51] and it was true again in the 1980s, as I have discussed elsewhere.[52] The recurrent problems of cooperative policies can be largely explained by the fact that its engineers failed to understand that cooperatives will inevitable become the rural foci of the normative struggles quietly raging

around notions of development and modernity in Zambian society.

There have been several dimensions to these struggles. Under Humanist policy, cooperatives constituted the most significant resource channel from the state to local communities. As a consequence, rhetorical jostling for the moral high ground - or, to borrow a term form Kate Crehan, the 'struggle over meaning'[53] concerning who should run the cooperative and how it should function - was the often main arena where rights over the control of local resources were manipulated. In the course of these 'negotiations' cooperative societies became sites for contesting the rules and notions of (legitimate) authority.

At the same time, cooperatives have been part of an agricultural policy offensive intent on supplanting *citemene* (slash-and-burn) gardening with the chemo-genetic production of hybrid maize. Thus the normative struggles surrounding the cooperative were also debates concerning the contours of basic rural livelihoods: cash-cropping vs. subsistence food production; maize vs. cassava as a food staple; the pros and cons of utilizing credit, or chemical fertilizers, in household production; the modalities of land use and land tenure.[54]

Finally, the promotion of cooperatives and maize farming has been linked with a quasi-capitalist business ideology. Hence there was also an 'economic ethic' at stake in the local debates: should local actors favor individual accumulation at the expense of distribution among (matri)kin; should a man privilege his sons over his (matrilineal) nephews as his primary heirs; are spouses destined to struggle among themselves for the control of money, land and labor, or can households work together towards common aims; which is the quickest path to prosperity: the business of farming and trading, or clientilist politics?[55]

The lesson should be clear. Contrary to the functionalist fantasy, rural cooperatives were not (and could not be) an instrument of consolidating the value hegemony of a modernist state. As modern institutions and as instruments of modernity, they were unavoidably the arbiters of normative struggles. There is an important lesson about 'unintended consequences' to be learned here. Cooperatives were introduced to promote a modernist and bureaucratic value-hegemony. In this they failed. Yet in one

respect, the rural institutions introduced by the developmentalist state were very successful—they provided local communities with recognized and accessible sites for the negotiation of local normativities and political options. This experience recalls a central insight of anthropologists Max Gluckman and Victor Turner who argued that in rural Zambia, institutionalized forms of political and social conflict are constitutive of social order.[56] But while important to understand, this is only half the story. In the end, cooperatives were not felled by internal dispute or local politics, but by the removal of the agricultural subsidies upon which they depended. This was the achievement of the neo-liberal Structural Adjustment Programme from about 1989. As a result, not only is there virtually no 'rural development' in much of post-liberalization Zambia, with the demise of cooperatives there is no focal point for political negotiations between rural communities and the state.

Economic liberalization has contributed markedly to transforming the political landscape of modern Zambia. Modernization under liberalization is no longer a national project; it is now ever more explicitly a 'class' endeavor. Liberalized modernity (via the privatization and legalization of common resources) expresses the interests of a 'mercantile' class whose power is based on access to foreign exchange resources and political-administrative rents. Neo-liberal policies also bolster an individualist rhetoric of the entrepreneur as an iconic 'hero of development.' Compared with the nationalist rhetoric of Humanism, which stressed unity and common values, neo-liberal modernity is a divisive project. In this divisiveness resides the potential to inspire many forms of traditionalism and localism, including the quasi-ethnic regionalisms which Kaunda - for all his faults and excesses - worked hard to repress.

In itself, divisiveness is not a political problem, nor a threat to social order. What can make neo-liberal divisiveness problematic is the deteriorating socio-economic infrastructure in conjunction with Zambia's weak legacy of political pluralism in the national arena. In romantic representations of the proverbial African village, the 'palaver' has often functioned as a means to mediate between competing views. Kaunda's Humanism based its rhetoric of political negotiation within 'one-party participatory democracy' on this traditionalist model. But

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regardless of whether the palaver is fact or myth, it is evident that there is no such ready-made model for political negotiation in a multi-party situation.

The multi-party elections of 1991, in which the Movement for Multiparty Democracy usurped power from Kaunda's UNIP, were a model of orderly democratic transition. But what ensured orderliness in 1991 was not a tradition of power-sharing, but the overwhelming popularity of the opposition, based on militant grass-roots demands for change. Indeed, at the constituency level, there was little genuine competition between political forces as is evidenced by the landslide victory of MMD candidates in all but one of Zambia's nine provinces.[57] Consequently, there was no division of spoils afterward the elections, no need to work out political compromises nor coalitions.

I'm not arguing that a coalition government would make Zambia a more genuine democracy. Nor am I against a system of multi-party politics. What I am suggesting is that a multi-party system of electoral politics assumes relatively well-established procedures for mediating in and facilitating political competition.[58] In Zambia this is hardly the case. A legacy of 'normative functionalism' in the Zambian culture of politics has tended to repress the institutionalization of political negotiation, and of late, neo-liberal economics has undermined the institutions that could support the development of a pluralist culture of politics.

In 1996, the political struggle will feature a rematch between MMD and UNIP; most likely the race will be between the incumbent Frederick Chiluba and the ousted Kenneth Kaunda. This time around, the struggle lacks a charismatic savior figure, and the political slogans available to either side have been considerably tarnished by the dismal experiences of the past five years. Seen from the outside, this analysis counsels sensitivity and caution to those who would meddle in the negotiation of authority in a potentially volatile polity like Zambia. It also recommends careful thought about the notion of 'democracy' in a context of divisive politics and destabilizing economic policies.

I realize the irony of my own apparent nostalgia for a functionalist national unity. But looking around Africa in the 1990s, and listening to the growing echoes of 'ethnic rivalry' in the Zambian media breed uneasiness. The yawning gap between the medicine of democratization (as the formalized performance of multi-party elections), and the malady of nose-spin impoverishment and marginalization can easily create political space for the 'anti-democratic' rhetoric of localized communalism and confrontational micro-ethnicity.

Notes

[1] This article has appeared as *Working Paper 4/95* of the Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki.

[2] Much of this work has come out in the handsome *Social History of Africa* series edited for Heinemann and James Currey by Allen Isaacman and Jean Hay. Other memorable reads in this genre include Steven Feierman's *Peasant Intellectuals. Anthropology and History in Tanzania* (Wisconsin 1990); Luise White, *The Comforts of Home. Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi*, Marcia Wright, *Strategies of Slaves & Women. Life stories from East/Central Africa* (New York and London: Lillian Barber/James Currey 1993), and Karen Tranberg Hansen's rich compilation on *African Encounters with Domesticity* (Rutgers 1992).

[3] As with G. Hyden and M. Bratton (eds), *Governance and politics in Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1992).

[4] In Africa, Kenya is a particularly blatant example.

[5] London: Heinemann 1994.

[6] S. Berry, *No Condition is Permanent. The Social Dynamics of Agrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Wisconsin 1993).

[7] See eg., Guy Mhone, 'MMD: behind the paralysis in economic policy formulation,' *Southern African Political and Economic Monthly*, vol 5, no. 11 (August 1992).

[8] Eg., the work of Robert Chambers; see also Norman Uphoff, *Learning from Gal Oya: possibilities for participatory development and post-Newtonian social science* (Ithaca: Cornell U.P 1992); Cf. Nici Nelson & Susan Wright (eds), *Power and participatory development. Theory and practice* (London: Intermediate Technology Publications 1995), for notably non-nostalgic perspectives on power relations in local communities.

[9] G. Hyden, 'The role of social capital in African development – Illustrations from Tanzania' in H.S. Marcussen (ed), *Improved natural resource management. The role of the state vs that of the local community*. International Development Studies, Roskilde University: Occasional Paper 12 (Roskilde 1994), pp. 101-18. For a critical overview, see J-P Platteau, 'Behind the market stage where real societies exist' Part I: *Journal of Development Studies* vol 30, no, 3 (April 1994); Part II: *Journal of Development Studies*, vol 30, no 4 (July 1994).

[10] Else Skjønsberg, *Change in an African village* (Kumarian, Press 1989), p.1.

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[11] V. Turner, *Schism and continuity in an African society. A study of Ndembu village life* (Manchester 1957); esp. chapter VI on 'Village fission, slavery and social change.'

[12] Moore and Vaughan, *op.cit.*; see also works by Werbner and Chanock cited below (notes 22 & 23).

[13] For one shining example, see Johannes Fabian, *Power and Performance. Ethnographic explorations through proverbial wisdom and theater in Shaba, Zaire* (Wisconsin 1990).

[14] Richard Brown, 'Indirect rule as a policy of adaptation' in R. Apthorpe, *From Tribal Rule to Modern Government*. (The Thirteenth Conference proceedings of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute for Social Research), Lusaka 1960 (reprinted 1966), p. 49; citing M. Perham, 'Lord Lugard: a preliminary evaluation' *Africa* (July 1950), pp. 228-39.

[15] Lugard, 'Introduction' in C.F. Strickland, *Cooperation for Africa* (London: Oxford University Press 1933), pp. vii-viii.

[16] Cf J. Merle Davis, *Modern Industry and the Africa. An Enquiry into the Effect of the Copper Mines of Central Africa upon Native Society and the Work of the Christian Missions* (London: Frank Cass 1967); also published originally in 1933.

[17] See, for example, Godfrey and Monica Wilson, *The Analysis of Social Change, Based on Observations in Central Africa* (Cambridge University Press 1945), pp. 22-3, concerning the impact of 'civilization' upon increased sexual immorality.

[18] Lugard, *loc.cit.*

[19] *Ibid.*, p. ix.

[20] 'Domestic' issues were crimes and conflicts among Africans, ie., those that did not involve Europeans. A parallel system of formal law existed for the mediation in issues of specific interest to colonials.

[21] Martin Chanock, *Law, custom and social order. The colonial experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge University Press 1985).

[22] Moore and Vaughan, p. 2. As the authors acknowledge, these insights are an expansion on the pioneering work of Richard Werbner, 'Federal administration, rank and civil strife among Bemba royals and nobles,' *Africa*, vol 37 (1967), pp. 22-49.

[23] Chanock, *op.cit.*, p. 4 (my emphasis). See also Sally Falk Moore, *Social facts and fabrications. 'Customary' law on Kilimanjaro, 1880 — 1980* (Cambridge University Press 1986).

[24] Chanock, *loc. cit.*

[25] Lugard, *op.cit.*

[26] The Central African Federation amalgamated Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi) from 1953 to 1963. The move to federate the three colonies expressed most clearly the political interests of white settler farmers seeking to increase their self-determination with respect to control by the Colonial Office. See R.I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964* (Harvard University Press 1966).

[27] For more on this see my *Luapula: dependence or development?* (Lusaka and Helsinki 1989).

[28] See Kenneth Kaunda, *Humanism in Zambia and a guide to its implementation*. Vol 1 (Lusaka: Zambia Information Services 1968), Vol 2 (Lusaka: Division of National Guidance 1974).

[29] C. Gertzel, C. Baylies & M. Szeftel, 'Introduction: The making of the one-party state' in their *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia* (Manchester 1984), p. 10.

[30] This accusation has naturally emerged periodically, eg. *Southern African Political and Economic Monthly* (various articles), 1991.

[31] Pearl T. Robinson suggests that political changes such as we are seeing in the 'democratization' movements in Africa should be inspected against the backdrop of the prevailing 'culture of politics' a term she credits to anthropologist Arjun Appadurai. In Robinson's usage, 'the term "culture of politics" refers to political practice that is culturally legitimated and socially validated by local knowledge. Rooted in a community's habits, customs and symbols regarding power, participation and representation, its mores are readily accessible to elites and ordinary people alike. Moreover (and this is a critically important point), a given culture of politics may be altered over time through a process of political learning. A culture of politics is thus the product of a polity's distant and its more proximate political past' (P.T. Robinson, 'Democratization: understanding the relationship between regime change and the culture of politics' *African Studies Review*, vol 37, no 1 (April 1994), pp. 39-40).

[32] Kaunda, *Humanism* I, p. 27.

[33] *Humanism* I, p. 17.

[34] K. Kaunda, 'Towards complete independence' (Address to UNIP National Council, Matero Hall, Lusaka, 11 August 1969), p. 62; cited in T. Kandeke, *Fundamentals of Zambian Humanism* (Lusaka: Neczam, 1977), p. 10.

[35] *Humanism* I, p. 7.

[36] *Humanism* I, p. 5

[37] *Humanism* I, pp. 7-8.

[38] *Humanism* I, p. 5.

[39] See eg. *A Humanist in Zambia — letters from Kenneth Kaunda to Colin Morris* (1966).

[40] *Humanism* I, p. 13.

[41] Kaunda, *Humanism* II, p. 14.

[42] On this theme see eg., Edward Shils, 'On the comparative study of the new states' in C. Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States. The quest for modernity in Asia and Africa* (London: Free Press of Glencoe 1963).

[43] S. M. Chipungu, *The state, technology and peasant differentiation in Zambia. A case study of the Southern Province 1930-1986.* Lusaka: Historical Association of Zambia 1988, pp. 161-2, 217.

[44] *Humanism* I, p.3.

[45] L. Lohmann, T. Wallgren and W. Permpongsacharoen discuss the strategies of insulation, digestion and subversion in cross-cultural confrontations: 'Intercultural Politics. The coevolution of a Forestry Master Plan and its Critiques' (Helsinki 1994) *mimeo*.

[46] K. Kaunda, *Letter to my children*, p. 70, 71; cited in Clive Dillon-Malone, *Zambian Humanism, Religion and Social Morality* (Ndola: Mission Press 1989) pp. 39, 42.

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[47] Michael Cowen, pers. comm.

[48] Richard A. Hilbert, *The classical roots of ethnomethodology—Durkheim, Weber and Garfinkle*. (Chapel Hill/London: University of North Carolina Press 1992), p. 170 (emph. in original).

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

[50] The pluralist First Republic lasted from Independence in 1964 until 1972. Zambia's second Republic was established amidst an atmosphere of intense political competition between UNIP, the UPP (United Progressive Party) of Kaunda's former comrade-in-arms and vice-president, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, and the ANC (African National Congress) of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, from which UNIP had splintered during the independence struggle. The illegalization of opposition parties in 1973 established UNIP hegemony. The victory of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in 1991 ushered in the 3rd Republic. For a nutshell history of the first and second republics, see B.S. Chisala, *Lt. Luchembe — Coup Attempt* (Lusaka: Co-op Printing 1991), pp. 1-35.

[51] C. Stephen Lombard, 'The growth of co-operatives in Zambia 1914-71', *Zambian Papers, No. 6* (University of Zambia, Institute for African Studies 1971); R. Bates, *Rural Response to Industrialization. A Study of Village Zambia* (Yale University Press 1976); M. Bratton, *The Local Politics of Rural Development. Peasant and Party-State in Zambia* (University Press of New England 1980).

[52] J. Gould, 'Local strategies and directed development: cooperatives between state and community in Luapula' in Kate Crehan and Achim von Oppen (eds.), *Planners and History. Negotiating 'Development' in rural Zambia* (Lusaka: Multimedia Publications 1994).

[53] K. Crehan, "Structures of meaning and structures of interest: peasants and planners in North-Western Zambia" in P. Kaarsholm (ed.), *Culture and Development in Southern Africa* (Baobab Press 1988).

[54] See Philip Gatter, *Indigenous and institutional thought in the practice of rural development: a study of an Ushi chiefdom in Luapula, Zambia*. Ph.D. thesis (SOAS: University of London 1990).

[55] On this see, eg., Han Seur, *Sowing the good seed. The interweaving of agricultural change, gender relations and religion in Serenje District, Zambia*. Ph.D. thesis (Wageningen Agricultural University 1992).

[56] Turner, *op.cit.*; M. Gluckman, *Custom and conflict in Africa* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1955).

[57] See Jan Kees van Donge, 'Zambia: Kaunda and Chiluba. Enduring patterns of political culture' in Wiseman (ed.) *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Routledge: forthcoming)

[58] For a similar argument see E. Poluha, 'Elections in Ethiopia and Africa - Focusing an Irrelevant Ritual?' *News from Nordiska Afrikainstitutet*, No. 3 (October) 1995.

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