



RESEARCH PAPERS

from the Department of Society
and Globalisation

Institut for Samfund og Globalisering

Research Paper no. 6/06

**URBAN COMPETITION AND URBAN
CRISIS:**

**COPENHAGEN ON THE MOVE INTO
GLOBAL SOCIETY**

Anni Greve

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Research Papers from the Department of Society and Globalisation, Roskilde University, Denmark.

Working paper series

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ISSN 1399-1396

Abstract: The essay gives a brief summary of Michel Foucault's 1978-1979 lectures which offers an important point of reference for a deeper understanding of the shift from liberal to neo-liberal ideas. Here he points out that neo-liberalism is an art of government that seeks to enforce competition: 'it is a historical task for an art of government and not due to the natural order of things'. But Foucault's lectures have not resulted in any empirical analyses so far. The second part of the essay undertakes what I have just said has been lacking thus far in this context, namely empirical analysis. It offers insight into a major comparative research project led by Jacques Donzelot. The preferred focus of the research project is contemporary European metropolises and the policies involved in 'rebuilding the city'. This essay deals with the case of Denmark with regard to: a) the nature of the urban crisis, with a specific focus on Copenhagen; b) the neo-liberal inflexion of urban, social and safety policies; and c) the consequences of this neo-liberal inflexion that has been given to citizenship

Keywords: Michel Foucault's 1978-1979 lectures on neo-liberalism – Jacques Donzelot's comparative research project on cities – the case of Copenhagen

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Preface: This report of four essays is outcome of readings into and meetings with the French sociologist Jacques Donzelot. It is hard not to remember Jacques Donzelot when one has had the opportunity to read his main books. For good reason *La police des familles* (1978) and *L'Invention du social* (1986) both have had impact on contemporary Danish sociology. Today, Donzelot is involved in a major comparative research scheme titled "Ville, Violence et Dependence Sociale – L'inflexion neo-liberale des politiques urbaines, sociale et de securité" at PUCA – Le Plan Urbanisme Construction et Architecture – under the French Ministry of Research and Technology. His latest books *Faire société: la politique de la ville aux États-Unis et en France*, Seuil, 2003 (with Catherine Mével and Anne Wyvekens) and *Quand la ville se défait: Quelle politique face à la crise des banlieues*, Seuil, 2006 both offer insights into aims, perspectives and outcomes of the study.

The comparative research scheme includes seven European countries: Holland, Denmark, England, Germany, Italy, Belgium and France. This report deals with the case of Denmark. We have had the opportunity to present our thoughts at a seminar April 2006; besides we have got the possibility to participate in a session on the case of England June 2006. Both seminars were organized by PUCA. The more we have come into the task the more one realizes the level of its ambitions. Jesper Visti Hansen has been with us as important moderator and interpreter of Donzelot's work.

The report consists of four distinct essays that are meant to be read in chronological order:

1. Introduction

Anni Greve

2. Urban politics in Denmark

Hans Thor Andersen

3. City and security: The case of social welfare in Denmark with a focus on housing policy

Peter Abrahamson

4. Changing concepts for handling dangers in the city: The case of Copenhagen

Anni Greve

URBAN COMPETITION AND URBAN CRISIS:

COPENHAGEN ON THE MOVE INTO GLOBAL SOCIETY

By Anni Greve, Roskilde University, Denmark

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Introduction

Urban competition and urban crisis

Today Denmark is listed as one of the most competitive nations in the *World Competitiveness Report*, the *Competitiveness Year book* and the weekly journal *The Economist* (*Dagbladet Information*, 6 April 2005). It has a flexible labour market thanks to its extensive social security system, a well-functioning infrastructure financed by high taxes, and a committed and confident work force. According to these reports, Denmark also offers a relatively stable framework for investment and financial flows. Place matters, and Denmark is a case in point. Moreover, within the last two decades Copenhagen has been promoted as “the future power house of Denmark”. Because of the claim that Denmark itself, through the Copenhagen region, can become a bridgehead for the whole of Scandinavia in the EU, it has been decided that this region especially must be supported (Jørgensen and Tonboe 1992). There is no doubt that Copenhagen is moving into the global society. One result of this is the increase in patterns of social segregation and exclusion similar to those found in other global cities.

This report has a double aim. First, it takes another look at criteria at work in present reports about the case of Denmark. They reflect a return to liberal themes but, with the notion of the competitive advantage of cities, they also reflect a shift towards neo-liberal ideas of the proper art of government. In his 1978-1979 lectures on liberalism, Michel Foucault offered an important point of reference for a deeper understanding of the shift from liberal to neo-liberal ideas, pointing out that neo-liberalism is an art of government that seeks to enforce competition: ‘it is a historical task for an art of government and not due to the natural order of things’. But Foucault’s lectures have not resulted in any empirical analyses so far; as David Garland puts it (Garland 1997: 199), ‘Foucault is a historian of systems of thought and an archaeologist whose concern is to uncover and differentiate epistemes’. However, ‘the creation of such abstractions is not an end in itself, but rather a heuristic step in the process of empirical analysis.’ I will give a brief summary of Foucault’s lectures here, well aware of its limitations due to its high degree of generality.

Secondly, the report aims to undertake precisely what I have just said has been lacking thus far in this context, namely empirical analysis. The report is part of a major comparative research project led by Jacques Donzelot.¹ Donzelot argues that, during the last thirty years, contemporary forms of regimes in the west have witnessed an increase in a new art of government, i.e. a transition from classical liberalism (including Keynesianism) to neo-liberalism. In line with Foucault, Donzelot argues that neo-liberalism distinguishes itself, ‘not so much by the introduction of an immoderate confidence in the “natural” laws of the market to the detriment of the state, as by the attribution of a leading role to the state in the production of competition’. The preferred focus of Donzelot’s comparative research project is on civil society, more precisely the big city of today and the policies involved in ‘rebuilding the city’. In the process of economic restructuring and globalization, the modern city has been re-thematized as *the* locus for economic exchange and productivity (see also Sassen 1994; Soja 2000²). Today the global market economy is moving into the city,

¹ Jacques Donzelot, *Le Plan Urbanisme Construction et Architecture* (PUCA), CNRS, France.

² The processes of economic restructuring and globalisation create a fragmented cityscape, both geographically and socially. The expanded scale of the ‘Exopolis’ (Soja’s third discourse) reflects this geographical fragmentation in its ‘increasingly discontinuous, fragmented, polycentric, and

with huge social implications. It has given rise to new waves of immigration and new patterns of social segregation, in the words of Donzelot to 'a globalisation from the bottom'. All western countries, says Donzelot, are fighting against the logic of separation.

Nevertheless, all countries don't conceive them in the same spirit. Two of them are particularly contrasted: France and the US. In a way they mark out the field of existing policies, or at least of those we started to observe in several European countries. It is important to notice that behind those policies one can find conceptions of society whose roots are to be found in quite different sociological traditions [and regime forms, AG]. That is what we want to analyze: that concrete confrontation between competing theories of what leads to social integration.

(Donzelot 2006).

The major part of the report offers insight into the case of Denmark with regard to: a) the nature of the urban crisis, with a specific focus on Copenhagen; b) the neo-liberal inflexion of urban, social and safety policies; and c) the consequences of this neo-liberal inflexion that has been given to citizenship.

The neo-liberal turn: Foucault revisited

In 1978-1979 Michel Foucault gave a series of lectures which were to become key texts in the later literature on governmentality.³ A fixed point in the lectures is the decisive historical breaks which forge the path for modern ideas of government, especially in the break between the classical governmental *savoir faire*, whose justification lay in defending territories and strengthening the sovereign's power, and the modern notion of 'political arithmetic', whose immediate justification lay in the new population problems connected with industrialization: population, development, emancipation and poverty. The lectures comprise a reading of philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment. With these philosophers – above all David Hume and Adam Ferguson – Foucault argues, we see the rise of a completely new way of perceiving civil society. Society is made up of individuals with 'passions' and 'interests', who think for themselves, regardless of their role and status in society, and furthermore act in accordance with what they think and feel. This is not to say that they act against the will of the sovereign, but that they act from the viewpoint of their particular, personal interests. Adam Ferguson argued that the human being is 'destined from the first age of his being to invent and contrive. Both primitive cottage and palace are equally distant from any mythical state of nature and are in that sense equally unnatural: that is natural to man as an inventive species' (quoted in Burchell 1991: 135). A precondition for the ability to take care of oneself is the capacity to invent, to problematize and to find one's way. It is a mode of questioning.

almost kaleidoscopic socio-spatial structure' (Soja 2000: 235). This spatial structure is mirrored in the social space of the 'Fractal city' (the fourth discourse), which is marked by labour market segmentation; compartmentalisation based on race, ethnicity and gender; gentrification and ghettoisation; the nouveau riche and yuppies; the squeeze in the middle-class; DINK (double income, no kids) households; 'Burger Kinged' workers, abandoned children, poor elderly and immigrants (ibid.: 275-278).

³ The following builds upon Burchell et al. 1991, and selected lectures of Foucault from 1978 to 1979, more precisely 'Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours du 10.01.79 - 05.04.79'. Graham Burchell's contribution (Burchell 1991), which contains a comparison between G.A. Pocock's *The Machiavellian Moment* (1975) and Foucault's lectures, has been a fruitful source of insight in reading Foucault's lectures.

This theory of an empirical subject of interests brings to the fore a new attitude about governing, one which recognizes that the dynamics of society stem from the many individuals who are able to act from the viewpoint of ‘passions of interests’. For the first time, Foucault argues, we see the emergence of an art of government that recognizes a realm of society outside the framework of jurisprudential conceptions of sovereignty. It is understood as a ‘a transactional domain’; ‘at the frontier of political power and what “naturally” eludes its grasp it constitutes a space of problematization, a fertile ground for experimental innovation in the development of political technologies of government’ (Burchell 1991: 40). It is a realm with its own rules, an object domain possessing a naturalness of immanent, self-regulatory mechanisms, which should be governed in accordance with the principle of *laissez faire*. The objective ‘becomes that of securing the conditions for the optimal and, as far as possible, autonomous functioning of economic processes within society’, or, ‘of enframing natural processes in mechanisms of *security*’⁴ (Burchell 1991: 137). In other words, we see a call for proper rules in society, or, for the institutionalization of a modern ‘grammar of the common that is open to all and can be made human’ (Hénaff and Strong 2003).⁵ Liberalism requires a proper use of liberty, ‘a formula for the mutual adjustment of the antinomic principles of law and order’, ‘a government of law not of men, less on the grounds of the juridical conceptions of the contractual foundation of political society than by reference to the technical adequacy of juridical forms to the regulation appropriate to a liberal art of government’ (Burchell 1991: 139).⁶

Foucault presents liberalism as a principle and method for rationalizing governmental practice, ‘a need to maintain a suspicious vigilance over government’. At the same time – and this is where Foucault’s project sets in – liberalism is a form of government that seeks to implement the structural frameworks for the individual’s action; the empirical subject of interests does not emerge out of nothing, but is the result of several socio-cultural factors within civil society. Liberalism is ‘a government of interests, a government which works through and with interests, both those of individuals and, increasingly to those attributed to the population itself’ (Burchell 1991: 127). From a liberal governmental optic,

the population is the subject of needs, of aspirations, but it is also the object in the hands of the government, aware, vis-à-vis the government, of what it wants, but ignorant of what is being done to it. Interest at the level of the consciousness of each individual who goes to make up the population, and interest considered as the interest of the population regardless of what the particular interests and aspirations may be of the individuals who compose it, this is the new target and the fundamental instrument of the government of population: the birth of a new art, or at any rate of a range of absolutely new tactics and techniques.

(Foucault 1991: 100)

⁴ ‘Liberalism’, says Foucault, ‘is a culture of hazards which is characterized by both the loss of security and by increasing attempts at finding new forms of insurance’ (Foucault, 24 Jan. 1979). On this point, Foucault is in line with modern poverty research. ‘A prolonged social learning process of coping with uncertainty can be discerned: a constant oscillation between the temptation to cling to meta-social and meta-historical quarantines of social order and establishing new notions of social reassurance, which would help people to regain security, their social identities and social competence’ (Helga Nowotny 1991: 28).

⁵ Cities offered a grammar for trade, in zones set apart where many odd things could happen, such as commodity exchange. Markets were spheres of transformation where a commodity could be transformed into something different through exchange in an informal atmosphere that had less regard for status and rank, and where commodities and information were exchanged extensively. The market place was the place *par excellence* where things were done differently, and people were supposed to come as free men and act as such, otherwise there would be no trading. This quality attracted quite a number of people and made them move into the city.

⁶ ‘A good government is no longer recognized from the angle of jurisdiction and justice, but from the viewpoint of a specific realm of truth constituted by commerce’ (Foucault 17.01.79).

The antinomies of modern western political reason have to do with what Foucault terms ‘a governmentalisation of the state’: in the name of society, the economic *subject of interests* is allowed to pose demands upon the state. ‘The freedom of the labourer may not be a threat to enterprise and production. Incidents that occur to all individuals at certain times of their lives, disease and death, constitutes a danger not only to the individual but also to society. The freedom of the individual may not threaten security. It is the conditions of liberalism’.⁷ In the name of society, the citizen as *a legal subject of rights* has reached to a position where he or she is permitted to make claims upon the government. With the legal codification of citizenship, the citizen now has the right to make claims for recognition on, or against, the state. The point is that the liberal state cannot give proper answers to these claims. There is no right to health, says Foucault. The liberal state enables and legitimizes claim-making through legalization, but with the break from absolutism, it has broken the chains to a direct steering of civil society.⁸ Therefore, practical principles for the effective conduct of government

presuppose some way of conceiving how these individuals with diverse social and economic forms of existence, individuals who are members of particular groups and ‘communities’, who are living beings, parts of a biological population, and who have different particular interest, needs aptitudes and abilities, are to be integrated within various sectors of ‘society’. [...] How can these different modes of integrating the individual within society and its englobing political order be co-ordinated?

(Burchell 1991: 144)

‘Die Ordo liberale’ or ‘die Freiburger Schule’

Evidently, the problem of post-war liberal regimes differed considerably from those of the classical liberals: ‘How is it in future possible and legitimate to take a free market economy for granted, which should guarantee the state’s limitation and, simultaneously, accept its existence?’⁹ Foucault pays specific interest to the German neo-liberals, ‘die Ordo Liberalen’ or ‘die Freiburger Schule’. Like ‘die Frankfurter Schule’, they are concerned about the irrationalities of capitalistic economy: ‘How is it possible to conceive of, define and shape a rationality which brings to an end the irrationality of capitalism’. Foucault points out that in these two schools we see two approaches to the same problem. I quote at length here:¹⁰

How does neo-liberalism differ from classical liberalism? In classical liberalism, the market place is defined from viewpoint of money [i.e. the mechanisms of exchange and the ‘natural prize’, AG]. The leading idea or model is that of freedom of trade, of laissez faire and equilibrium. It is founded upon the principle of private property guaranteed by the state. In neo-liberalism the leading idea of trade is not money, but competition.... Competition is a guarantee to the rationality of economy. It is the task of the state to put limits to monopolies, to improve competition.... Classical liberalism as well as neo-liberalism sees the principle of laissez faire as precondition for trade. It is the logical implication of trade. But competition is not a final result of a natural law. Competition is a principle for formalization ... a logic which has to be respected. Competition, like the logic of economy, the pure competition is end result of active politics; it is a historical task for an art of government, and not due to the natural order of things. Competition is a principle of formalization, a formal play between inequalities, and not a natural play between individuals. A formal structure does not

⁷ Foucault, 24 January 1979.

⁸ ‘What is distinctive about liberal political rationality is that it breaks the identity of maximum governmental effectiveness and maximizing government itself’ (Burchell 1991: 138).

⁹ Foucault, 7 February 1979.

¹⁰ Foucault, 7 February 1979.

arise from intuitive feelings of subjects. Competition, like logics of the economy ... is the object of active political politics, a historical task for the art of government.

Hypothesis relative to the nature and size of the urban crisis

What do we mean by crisis? In his 1978-1979 lectures, it is a central point of Foucault's that classical liberalism, including the welfare state, is characterized by an oscillation between state scepticism due to the risks of intervening in the 'natural' processes of 'passions of interests', and the need to act upon social agency. A proper art of government should act upon the 'natural' processes of civil society, and not be the principal agency of social forces. 'It is by reference to an already existing society that the state's role and function have to be defined, and it is the natural, self-producing existence of this society that the state has to secure so that it functions to optimal effect' (Burchell 1991: 140).¹¹ Therefore, when we speak about a crisis in the model of integration, it is either because the state has attained too much power or because it is unable to act upon the 'natural' processes of civil society.

When we speak about a crisis in the model of integration, it is not a crisis due to the government's limited capacity to meet claims but a crisis in its way of conceiving how individuals with different particular needs are to be integrated within various sectors of society. Burchell (Burchell 1991: 144) expresses this as a matter of

how these individuals with diverse social and economic forms of existence, individuals who are members of particular groups and 'communities', who are living beings, parts of a biological population, and who have different particular interest, needs aptitudes and abilities, are to be integrated within various sectors of 'society'(...) How to establish a scheme in which these different modes of integrating the individual within society and its englobing political order can be co-ordinated?

Today, indeed, there is a crisis in the model of integration which has dominated modern welfare regimes, which is connected with its inability to catch up with 'competition' and 'population'. There is a change going on involving a new focus upon the city. The city is being reinvented, or reframed, in terms of 'The Global City' or 'The Big City'. Today a considerable number of liberal democracies include the city as a task for a new art of government directed towards the enforcement of competition. Compared to classical liberalism's idea of the city, we are witnessing a significant inflexion.

The city reconsidered

More than hundred years ago, the classical sociologist Emile Durkheim remarked that the city is an archaic form of organization in relation to the needs and interests of large-scale industry. 'Not being particularly urban in any way, [large-scale industry, AG] could not conform to a system that had not been designed for it':

In the first place its locus was not necessarily the town. It can even be installed far from any existing population settlement, whether rural or urban. It merely seeks the spot where it can be best supplied and from where it can spread out as easily as possible. Next, its field of activity is not confined to any

¹¹ 'Liberalism is a governmentality that wishes to offer carte blanche to freedom' (Foucault 17.01.79).

particular region and it draws its customers from anywhere.... An organisation based on territorial groupings (village, town, district or province, etc.) becomes progressively weaker.

(Durkheim 1983; 1884: xlix, liv)

Contemporary urban studies also argue within the same line of thought. Historically, the city has been decisive in the rise of modern societies: 'the culture of the city state has come to dominate state and society in the world of today' (Herman Hansen 2004). In crucial historical periods, the city has been a model for the structuring and development of modern democratic societies (see, for instance, Kolstrup 1996). But since then the city's centrality has come down to the realm of civil society. Whereas commerce is abstract and *global* – by its very nature, it can be anywhere – civil society is by nature *local*.

During the nineteenth century, the art of governing health became tied to a positive art of governing the city (Osborne 1996: 111). Studies went some way 'towards a particular consciousness of the environment of the infection as being characteristically *urban*.... The city itself, or particular regions of it came to be understood as the main crucible of fever, especially those domains given over to the poor; whole neighbourhoods became sites of fever or "fever districts"'. 'What was at stake was something more like a concern with the "depauperizing" of disease, coupled with a "naturalisation" of poverty' (Dean 1991). The idea of the modern welfare city is an extension of this. Civil society has to do with governed collective consumption, an idea culminating in Le Corbusier's *Plan Voisin* or Per Albin Hansson's *Folksbhemmet*.

Today, there is a change going on involving new ideas of the city: civil society is no longer conceivable as a realm literally separated from the realm of commerce and large-scale industry. Today the realm of the market place is on the move into the city, significantly expressed in the promotion of the idea of 'the Global City'. Certain cities are nominated as World Cities from the point of view of the global economy, places where 'flows' and 'mobilities' come together: the global is re-embedded in the local and sets the scene for 'glocalisation' (Robertson 1995; Moulart and Swingedow 2003). Thus place matters in a new sense of the term.

Security re-considered

From the viewpoint of the global economy, a good city is a safe city, one that offers stable frameworks for financial flows and exchanges, i.e. a relatively high degree of security for free competition. Thus we see the emergence of a new security economy concurrently with Copenhagen entering into the competition for visibility on the global city map. Place matters, and Denmark has become a case in point, not least due to its ability 'of enframing natural processes in mechanisms of security'¹² (Burchell 1991: 137). But societies fall apart: too many interests are at work of individuals with diverse social and economic forms of existence, and too few cohesive forces are going in the opposite direction. This is where Donzelot's comparative project kicks in. The aim is 'to identify the crisis of the model of integration in relation to urban, social and safety policies

¹² 'Liberalism', says Foucault, 'is a culture of hazards which is characterized by both the loss of security and by increasing attempts at finding new forms of insurance' (Foucault, 24 Jan. 1979). On this point, Foucault is in line with modern poverty research. 'A prolonged social learning process of coping with uncertainty can be discerned: a constant oscillation between the temptation to cling to meta-social and meta-historical quarantines of social order and establishing new notions of social reassurance, which would help people to regain security, their social identities and social competence' (Helga Nowotny 1991: 28).

compared with the numerous other recent causes of transformation of these policies’.

A pivotal point of Foucault’s is that politics matter, and within neo-liberalism it matters in a new sense of the term, its objective being more than laissez faire, with an active role to play in the instigation of competition. But when it comes to empirical analysis, politics differs in terms of remedies and philosophies of what leads to social integration.

A Danish form of welfare regime in transition

The Danish welfare model has been regarded as a relative success. It has a high degree of consent, not least because it includes all citizens (Esping-Andersen 1990). It is not only the poor and miserable but also the middle and upper classes who are entitled to basic support from the state. Welfare provisions are financed by general tax revenues and comprise retirement pensions from the age of 67, free access to a well-developed public health system, free access to schools and universities, and finally access to accommodation when in need. Therefore, it is argued, commerce and production have room for manoeuvre in times of prosperity as well as recession. The state offers the security and space for the free flows of enterprise and production, as well as for individual emancipation. It offers equality of opportunity, regardless of religion, ethnicity, sex, age etc. One of the issues that distinguish the Danish and other Scandinavian welfare societies from most others is the high rates of labour market participation and employment. For example, in Europe Denmark has one of the highest rates of female employment in the active labour force. Peter Abrahamson, (this volume henceforward ‘PA’¹³) demonstrates ‘that three out of four Danish women aged 15 to 65 are attached to the labour market while that is only the case for less than two out of three in France and generally in Europe’. This has sown the seeds of a distinct family type, the contract-based family relation system. The ideal is to maximize not dependence on the family, but capacities for individual independence, which means that one can choose to stay in or, alternatively, leave a marriage (see Walzer 1994 on this right to leave).

But the welfare state has been subject to problems too. Returning it has been demonstrated that claims upon the state have reached their peak. The welfare model finds itself in what Jürgen Habermas termed, in 1971, a ‘crisis of legitimacy’: it is unable to fulfil its promises because there are limits to its financial resources. From the side of the market it is argued that the role of the state in securing the conditions for the optimal functioning of economic processes within society has been weakened by a ‘politics against the market’, although, when it comes to services, not very efficiently. According to PA: ‘It has been convincingly argued that when it comes to family policy and especially social services for children France (and Benelux) stands out from the other Continental countries with provisions meeting or surpassing Scandinavian standards (Anttonen and Sipilä 1996).’ Thus today we see a return to liberal themes. As in most other western nations, changing Danish governments subsequently advocate a new ethos of prudence and an ‘enterprise culture’ as a new model for social and economic citizenship (Foucault 1978-1979; Gordon 1987, 1991).

¹³ PA is an abbreviation for Peter Abrahamson; all quotations marked PA are taken from his contribution to this report; see Research Paper no. 8/06, ‘City and security: the case of social welfare in Denmark with a focus on housing policy’.

What happened when Copenhagen opened its doors to the global economy? Some consequences have begun to show, just as in many other metropolises that are seeking a position on the global city map. Capitalism is not uniformly and unequivocally good for all the members of society: what is good for some may be bad for others. For a considerable proportion of citizens, the extension of capitalism has caused cultural traumas in terms of ‘sudden, comprehensive, fundamental and unexpected changes’ (Sztompka 2004: 159). Returning the individual is left in a kind of cultural limbo or ‘moral vacuum’. The bonds of civil society are being weakened. One indication is an increase in vandalism, burglary, violence and serious and more frightening crime in districts that used to be laboratories for visions about the good life (Ærø 2004). Some of them have turned into deprived neighbourhoods and become subject to projects for ‘lifting up the quarter’.

Another major factor is the restrictive Danish policy of integration immigrants, which favours the principle of assimilation. From day one in the country, immigrants are supposed to behave like Danish citizens and forget about the social traumas that a sudden shift of the environment often causes. They settle in Denmark with a high risk of ending up in a moral vacuum or downright anomie. ‘Today the percentage of unskilled or unemployed poor male immigrants of the total prison population is about 25’ (Balvig 2005).

Today it is argued that the traditional measurements and strategies of institutions have reached their limits. They are insufficient. The terminology of freedom is producing new forms of inequality with a spatial dimension.

Housing: from the logics of *zoning* to the logics of *density*

In the late 1990s, a number of riots in Vollsmose, a suburb of the city of Odense, gave rise to second thoughts about modern urban planning (Cowi Consult 2000). Situated outside the centre of the city, Vollsmose was created in accordance with leading ideas of the 1960s, above all the principle of *zoning*. Safely separated from large-scale industry and the bad places of inner-city concrete, standardized buildings with plenty of light, fresh air and good hygiene were built to meet the needs of a working population after hours. Today the inhabitants of the suburb are of a different kind, mostly immigrants and/or refugees without a stable relationship to the labour market, but some with the entrepreneurial skills to create their own shops. But from the viewpoint of economic interests and social networking, this is difficult in environments where the shopping mall seems to have replaced the seething life of the market place. Thus, one type of diagnosis deals with the discrepancy between the needs of the former inhabitants and those of today.

These reflections go well together, with an overall shift within urban planning from the logics of *zoning* to the logics of *density*. In these years we are seeing the emergence of concepts like ‘the ecological city’ and ‘the compact city’ as some kind of thoroughgoing landmark. Following the influential English architect Richard Rogers (see Powel 1999), it is necessary to rethink the city in a new, ecological and compact way. The city should be the place where life is lived, where strangers can meet and where we all like to be. The strategy of the dormitory areas of the 1960s has failed in most big cities of Europe: the riots in Brixton, Vollsmose and recently Clichy-sous-Bois, Rogers would argue, are visible and indeed brutal reactions to the mistakes that are inherent in the principle of zoning. What is needed is a renaissance for the big city. Those living in the suburbs must go back to the inner city, and the empty spaces of the centre must be reinvented. Rogers goes for the principle of flexibility within

architecture: one and the same building should be able to accommodate different kinds of people (mixed housing) and different kinds of function, one day a gas station, another day a house of culture. What is more, the idea of the compact city, remarkably promoted by the Urban Task Force in London, assumes that the reinvention of the city centre will fertilise the ground for new and modern forms of civil bonds, i.e. bonds of civility providing 'a common ground for transactions between persons from different backgrounds with different interests' (Ikegami 2005: 29).

However, the invention of new ideas about the good city has given rise to new forms of segregation: inner-city renovation, the price explosion and gentrification, to the rise of urban glamour zones and urban war zones (Sassen 1994), and, on the national level, 'the social map of Denmark'. Below the focus is on the urban crisis as it is problematized within urban politics. In part the degree to which urban politics is an extension of a welfare regime is examined, while a neo-liberal inflexion is also identified, i.e. the ways in which urban policy is seeking to catch up with a new situation. In other words, this section deals with Donzelot's main thesis in respect of *housing*: 'we see two types of concerns juxtaposed. On the one hand, we find the classical policies eager to satisfy housing needs in the name of the right to housing. On the other hand, we can see more and more policies in Europe which aim precisely at facilitating the access to property, especially including the low income part of the population by long-term loans'. (Donzelot 2006)

Urban politics in Denmark

To what extent are urban and housing policies extensions of a form of regime? I agree with John Andersen (Andersen 2005) 'that it is extremely important to distinguish between the political content and outcome of the inclusion orientation in different regime contexts, between the neo-liberal/conservative welfare regime retrenchment context, and the inclusion orientation in the Social Democratic context with welfare regime stability'. Following Esping-Andersen (1990: 4) an understanding of the welfare state in terms of a form of regime includes human agency, that is, the social forces and social relations that gave rise to the modern welfare state. Esping-Andersen argues, against a functionalistic approach to the state, that 'politics not only matters, but is decisive': 'In contrast to most studies ... it is not necessarily the political mobilisation of the working classes that matters here. For some regimes, their role has been marginal and we must instead understand the evolution of welfare states here as the result of the state's history of nation building and/or the influence of conservatism and Catholicism'. The contemporary Danish welfare regime is the result of a green-red alliance, a compromise between a greater range of interests. Therefore, within the field of urban politics, we see more ideas at work about 'interests' and 'rights' to dwellings and the city. For example, at present, 'the Danish version of entrepreneurialism includes a clear mark of the welfare state, and instead of interpreting PPP as public-private partnerships, public-public or state-municipal partnerships would be more correct' (HTA¹⁴).

HTA has proposed an illuminating tripartite division of urban politics which, in the main, is followed in the presentation to come: 'It is exercised in three different ways: 1. as a policy directed towards steering and regulating cities and their internal conditions; 2. as a sector policy targeted at specific urban

¹⁴ HTA is an abbreviation for Hans Thor Andersen; all quotations marked HTA are taken from his contribution to this report. See Research Paper no. 7/06, 'Urban politics in Denmark'.

conditions, e.g. traffic policy, housing and planning policies; and 3. as a number of sector policies such as financial or social policy with intended, or unintended, urban effects’.

A policy directed towards steering and regulating cities and their internal condition

Copenhagen was on its knees in the late 1980s, when it finally entered the competition to become a leading metropolis in Europe. A government principle to equalise conditions in regions, counties and municipalities in east and west Denmark was left. It was argued that Denmark was in need of a locomotive for a national upturn, but also ‘that Denmark itself, through the Copenhagen region, can become a bridgehead for the whole of Scandinavia in the EC’ (National Planning Report, 1989). The immediate background was the bankruptcy of the municipality of Copenhagen. HTA: ‘The economic collapse generated a change in local planning and housing policy itself, but also a demand from central government to reduce the debt of the city. One way to do so was a sale of properties owned by the city; among these were the municipal housing stock. They were all sold in short time and turned into shared ownership [i.e. cooperative ownership, AG]. The result in terms of residential composition was a shift from marginal groups to students, employed and middle income groups. The only negative effect was the fact that after the sale the city had very few possibilities to help homeless people with accommodation’.

As in other countries, the leading idea was ‘facilitating the access to property, especially including the low income part of the population by long term loans’ (Donzelot 2006). Some have been offered the opportunity to buy a flat under a cooperative ownership scheme. ‘Since the late seventies it has been stated by law that if private owners of rental blocks want to sell, they have first to offer the tenants the possibility of collectively buying the apartment block. (Andersen et al. 2000: 10). This policy has left its stamp on the city in terms of scattered enclaves of gated communities of shareholders. Today, the good life of the provincial town is being unfolded in locked back yards in the very centre of Copenhagen, where the good and friendly society of equal men unfolds within the local microcosm of the backyard, while the streets outside are considered insecure (see Jane Jacobs 1963 on the safe street; also Carlberg and Møller Christensen 2005).

In late 1980s, an urban regime of Social Democratic entrepreneurialism was launched, in which the municipality became key actor in a harsh project, which was supposed to be “expense neutral”. As John Andersen notes (2005), a “politics of gambling which tends to follow a logic of irreversibility” calculated upon the sale of unused land at huge market prices, as the value of the ground expanded, would form basis for other projects, above all a new metro, the regeneration of the Copenhagen docklands, the transformation of a former military area, Holmen, into a fashionable district of well off residents, and Ørestaden. With these initiatives we see a return to liberal themes, but they are attended by a new steering philosophy formulated as a shift from the idea of urban renewal to urban revitalization. HTA:

Until the 1990s urban politics was about the public interest and for public resources to improve living conditions and particularly the general welfare of the poorest citizens. The continuous pressure from internationalisation/ globalisation/ Europeanization that disguises neo-liberal logic has replaced the welfare discourse with a more mixed (a typical Danish compromise) policy of both welfare and

entrepreneurial strategies (cf. Fotel and Andersen 2003). The decentralization of responsibilities of welfare provision to local governments has been followed by decentralization also of local economic policy as well a responsibility for labour market training and activation. Instead of urban renewal we have urban revitalisation. The most attractive spaces are used to house office complexes, shopping malls or high earning citizens

(Hansen, Andersen and Clark 2001; Desfor and Jørgensen 2004).

A sector policy targeted at specific urban conditions, e.g. traffic policy, housing and planning policies

During the last three decades, modern urban planning has witnessed two departures from leading ideas about the good welfare city. The first took place in the late 1970s, when planning moved its focus from the quantitative expansion of urban space to the qualitative change of the existing urban environment. HTA:

A new urban problem appeared during the 1980s; the concentrations of social marginalised groups in certain non-profit estates. [...] The coincident of a significant rise in unemployment during the 1970s ('oil-crisis') and the completion of several large-scale non-profit estates turned out to be a greenhouse for a new number of urban social problems. The resourceful families left as the problems with the concrete constructions produced a number of technical problems which the renters would have to pay for. The rising rents, migration of employed families and immigration of divorced, unemployed and alcohol abusers created an evil spiral: as more marginalised people arrived, the noise, vandalism and other difficulties became more significant and consequently better-off families moved.

In many respects, this left traces on the city in terms of spatial segregation. Spatial segregation itself is not a problem, but it becomes one when it gives rise to an accumulation of social problems. Therefore an important question for urban planning became how to prevent the concentration of social problems in certain vulnerable districts. HTA:

The government reacted by offering a scheme to cope with construction problems and to refurbish some of the estates. As a main criticism was the monotonous and boring look of the estates and the rising price of energy, many estates had new colourful facades and better isolation. The overall efforts were an attempt to make aesthetic improvements in order to put the deprived estates back on the tracks. Among the means used was landscaping of the green spaces between building blocks.

Gradually urban planning became participatory, architects learning how to build together with the users, and, moreover, using non-modernistic models for city planning. Urban politics has been marked by the implementation of a more holistic approach HTA: 'to combine efforts at a number of fields in the hope of producing a lasting change in terms of social wellbeing, empowerment and participation'.

Soon it became clear ... that primarily aesthetic matters would have little impact on the position of these estates. A more holistic approach, which could combine physical improvements with social interventions such as employment, setting up local networks and activities, was formulated as an experiment labelled Kvarterløft – an area based approach, where the basic philosophy was to combine efforts at a number of fields in the hope of producing a lasting change.

A second departure took place when Copenhagen was entered for a competition for a position on the global city map. During the 1990s, urban development has been marked by increasing heterogeneity. Some cities have been disadvantaged by industrial stagnation, unemployment and large expenses on welfare, while others have 'post-industrialized'. In the 1990s a new type of planning ideal was born, so-called 'negotiation planning', in which private enterprise negotiates with the municipal authorities on the mutual modification

of plans. Participation in the democratic sense of the term recedes into the background, and planners try to forget the great visions of cohesion and democracy, concentrating instead on urban planning within a framework of strict professional expertise. HTA:

The overall argument is competitiveness, a concept that almost all other kinds of local politics have to adjust to. The argument is not how you can improve living conditions, but how to improve the competitiveness. Housing policy focuses on developing former harbour areas into luxury apartment blocks, cultural policy on mega events that can attract customers, educational policy on how to provide a highly qualified labour force, and social policy to motivate the poorest to look after themselves and accept the lousiest jobs available.

In 2001 the Ministry of Urban and Housing Affairs was abolished, and measures for improving deprived neighbourhoods by means of community improving projects came to an end. The Ministry's field of responsibility was spread to a couple of new ministries, including the Ministry of Employment, and gradually a different rhetoric came into play. Now the social integration of immigrants through work lay at the very core of multiple initiatives.

Sector policies such as financial or social policy with intended, or unintended, urban effects

Only lately has the urban crisis been problematized within social policy in terms of exclusion and problematic zones. It is quite evident that policies in the 1970s and 1980s were not equipped to handle new social questions. The municipal reform of 1970 involved a profound reorganisation of local government in Denmark aimed at rationalisation and simplification, and implying a process of decentralisation where 'executive functions should be administered as close to the citizens as possible' (Andersen et al. 2000: 21). One implication was that the social administrative level increasingly turned into a self-contained system. The administration of social reforms in the early 1970s in a period marked by recession and municipal deficits contributed to the emergence of new forms of segregation. It has left traces on the city in other respects too. During the 1980s, the social administration of Copenhagen municipality relegated deviants and the poor in large numbers to neighbourhoods that used to be model estates for the working classes. The status of these estates gradually changed. Originally they had been designed to meet the needs of a working population after hours, but considerable numbers of this population had left. Those who stayed behind became the neighbours of new types of tenants: 1) long-term unemployed (concentrated among the middle-aged and elderly unskilled women and men) displaced through comprehensive slum clearance in Nørrebro and Vesterbro; 2) the mentally ill, due to the strategy in the 1970ies of closing down big institutions, including psychiatric hospitals; 3) immigrants and/or refugees without a staple relationship to the labour market; and 4) single-parent families, preferably single mothers. Within a short period of time, the municipality of Copenhagen had relegated social clients with 'a right to a home' to a limited, bounded set of neighbourhoods and even selective housing blocks within them. For example, the mentally ill were typically relegated to blocks with one-room flats. From silent oaths of solidarity they turned into loci of what has been termed 'a negative social spiral' (Skifter Andersen 2004).

Only in the 1990s did social policy problematize the urban crisis in terms of exclusion and problematic zones. It is possible to speak about two phases and two different philosophies: one takes up the meaning of place from the

viewpoint of social work,¹⁵ networks of strong ties and civil security, the other from the perspective of bonds of civility, networks of weak ties and civil security, reflecting a shift in governmental style. In 1994-1998 a large number of projects were put into operation to 'fight back criminality and increase security' (Christensen and Ærø 2003: 6), especially within those residential areas that used to be characterised by a positive social control. The philosophy of the initiatives was to deal with place from a communitarian point of view, i.e. to promote a sense of responsibility in the local area where people live and share affective bonds. As in other European cities, the initiatives pointed to 'the necessity of new forms of mechanical solidarity and the explicit organisation of cultural bonds' (Vranken 2005), in order to fight back anomie and promote a lost tradition for solutions to civil conflicts. The measures promoted included architectural renewals such as the regeneration of common spaces, i.e. community houses, parks, playgrounds etc., as well as social projects such as turning risky moments (for example, New Year's Eve) into 'events' based upon voluntary initiatives.

Today we are seeing the development of a different strategy. It is acknowledged that a local community's strong ties have disadvantages from the perspective of labour market integration. Therefore, for the moment, the conditions involved in creating bonds of weak ties enabling the city's social circles to be linked is becoming a new focus of attention. It is assumed that these conditions will improve opportunities for entering the labour market. The ghetto package of 2005 has a direct focus upon both immigrants and the development of parallel societies. It aims at bettering the conditions for creating bonds of weak ties linking the city's social circles, *first* by introducing a new model for the relegation of rental dwellings, with the aim of improving the principle of mixed housing; *secondly*, by establishing a committee of representatives from the social housing sector, the municipality and sectors external to the state with the aim of drawing up new, 'issue-directed measures', that is, how to use experiences from the parallel society as a platform for entering the Danish labour market and thus Danish society; and *thirdly*, by a more explicit focus on the role of the public school from the viewpoint above all of crime prevention.

Welfare and work: The terminology of freedom

'The Danish Model', with its extensive system of welfare arrangements and its traditions of mediation and reconciliation with regard to conflicts in the labour market (Strøby Jensen 1998; Lykketoft 2006), has been intensively promoted. And indeed, ideally speaking, the model of collective bargaining seems to 'work through and with interests' on both sides. HTA:

The main agreement of 1899 adopted a special Danish consensus-based negotiation model for the labour market, which has entailed that Denmark today, according to international competitiveness studies, has what are probably the best labour market relations in the world. Just as importantly, as early as the 1930s the labour movement committed itself to an upgrading strategy, by which unskilled

¹⁵ Partly due to the unemployment rate, the issue of the negative effects of social integration has been replaced by another issue, namely the fear of disintegration and social exclusion (Donzelot 1991). And the social work discourse is not solely interpreted in terms of social control: it still has the function of integrating clients into a stable order. But inclusion has both a negative and a positive dimension: whereas the negative dimension can be interpreted in terms of discipline and social control, the positive dimension has to do with the production of modern citizens (Osborne 1996) and new forms of social citizenship.

workers, via evening classes at vocational schools, were able to compete for skilled jobs, creating a domino effect resulting in the internationally unique skills level of the Danish workforce today. [...] Eighty per cent of Danes today are members of a union.

Nevertheless, Danish society has witnessed considerable changes, which has challenged the system. The economic growth of the 1960s and early 1970s influenced the social bonds of the labour movement considerably. In this period, we see a growing split between unions of skilled and unskilled labourers respectively; increasingly skilled labourers came closer to the lower middle classes in terms of income levels and dwelling preferences. In this period, families who could afford it moved out of public housing stocks, no longer living in boxes ‘from the cradle to the grave’, but choosing single-family detached houses in one of the suburbs that had sprung up on the outskirts of Copenhagen. Simultaneously, the view of the unskilled labourers changed. Given full employment, why should they not be able to take a decent job? Increasingly the delinquent and the poor came to be considered ‘excluded’ from society, rather than a weak link within a united social movement, as before.

In other words, the labour movement no longer offered a stable framework, a closely-knit tissue of norms and rules, to serve as a basis for solidarity among the workers. HTA:

The solidarity of flat-rate universalism presumes a historically peculiar class struggle, one in which the vast majority of the population are the ‘little people’ for whom a modest, albeit egalitarian, benefit may be considered adequate. Where this no longer obtains, as occurs with growing working-class prosperity and the rise of the new middle classes, flat-rate universalism inadvertently promotes dualism because the better off turn to private insurance and to fringe-benefit bargaining to supplement modest equality with what they have decided are accustomed standards of welfare.

PA: ‘One of the major changes which have occurred within the Danish welfare state over the last 20 years is the shifting of the burden of financing. In 1987 the central government covered 44 per cent of total costs, municipalities 40 per cent, employers 12 per cent and the employees only paid five per cent. However, in 2004 the state had reduced its contribution to 27 percent while the employees had increased their share to 21 per cent. The burden has been shifted from state to insured workers, which brings Denmark more in line with Continental Europe in this respect, as is shown in Table 7.

Table 7. Share of financing of total social expenditure 1987 – 2004 percentage terms

	State	Municipality	Employers	Employees
1987	43.8	39.8	11.7	4.7
1990	49.3	36.6	8.4	5.7
1995	39.3	35.1	10.9	14.7
2000	28.6	39.8	9.8	21.8
2004	26.8	41.2	19.9	21.0

Source: Statistics Denmark 2005.’

The social work discourse

Until the mid-1970s, high-spirited professionals worked hard replacing the positive and ‘normalising’ social control of the old social movements. Strong ideals, such as the ethics of vocation, have marked nursing and social work.

And strong ideals were certainly needed. But, it was argued, the ethics of vocation is displayed within asymmetrical relationships. This means that preferably, those aspects of relevance to integration into some kind of 'programme' are of interest to the social worker, whereas strong ideals of civic and social solidarity are displayed elsewhere. In the 1970s, the social work profession was criticised for being associated with processes of social stigmatisation. Those who made use of public services were regarded as self-confessed failures. In particular, those who applied for welfare aid – for public support – were said to feel 'pauperised'. Social work practices were thus interpreted within a discourse of discipline and (negative) social control (Greve 1998).

The unemployment rate of the 1980s and early 1990s gave rise to considerable changes. Gradually, the fear of 'stigmatization' was replaced by one of 'disintegration' and 'social exclusion'. Social work was reconsidered. Partly within the legal framework of the Social Assistance Act of 1976, social work continued to offer the classic forms of compensation for the negative effects of the market, for example, PA: 'In case of temporary loss of income, a generous and means-tested financial compensation should be granted'. But increasingly this was attended by measures aimed at 'inclusion' into civil society in the broad sense of the term, i.e. initiatives supporting the acquisition of competences for social citizenship. We see a 'culture shift' that sowed the seeds of positive, proactive policies. PA:

The early 1990s ... saw a change in welfare policy which can be identified as activation policies somewhat equal to the French insertion policy. Gradually, during the 1990s the Social Assistance Act has been changed regarding support for the young. Through the introduction of the so-called 'youth allowance' 18 years old and 19 years old can no longer receive social assistance passively. They have to submit themselves to either a job or a training activity, offered by the municipality, in order to receive cash benefits. As of April 1992 the youth allowance was expanded to encompass all 18 to 24 years old applying for help according to the Social Assistance Act. Within two weeks the municipality is supposed to have found a suitable job, training, education, or other activity, for which the young person will be paid the equivalent of what they used to collect in assistance payments.

This legislative change is indicative of the current trends in Danish welfare policy encompassing the change from passive support to active involvement introduced in 1979 with the Job-Offer Scheme, and now expanded into other areas of the welfare system. In 1993 Denmark got a new government, for the first time in more than ten years led by the Social Democrats, only to be replaced by a new centre-right government in 2001. Yet, we saw a continuation of the policy taking shape during the 1980s, and in 1997 the Social Assistance Act was replaced by the Act on Active Social Policy making crystal clear that insertion, inclusion and activation were and are the key words in social intervention towards the poor. The various changes of government have not changed these ideas.

The terminology of freedom

PA: 'Claus Olsen and Ida Marie Svendsen (2003) have analysed the recent changes regarding transfer payments within the Danish welfare state and they concluded that all changes refer to what can be labelled "the terminology of freedom." This means that, in comments on acts, government programmes etc., concepts such as self-determination, personal development, resources, putting the individual at centre stage etc. predominate. This is parallel to what Lone Moritz (2003) has indicated as a change from the family principle to the labour market principle within social assistance legislation. Earlier the focus was on a holistic approach, where the situation of the individual was interpreted with reference to the environment in the form of the family, labour market, housing etc., where the material and psychological dimensions were connected, and where the focus was

more on the history and past of the client. The new focus is now more on the present and future situation, emphasising labour market suitability and willingness within a contractual perspective of tying help to certain benchmarks. Olsen and Svendsen (2003: 99) are very critical of this contractual thinking, which presupposes an equal relationship between client and social worker, which, of course, never has existed and never will. 'This kind of norm carries with it a risk of a downplayed, invisible and in principle unlimited power domination: through a dramatic and obscure number of legal rules, through lack of stipulation of limits for what is relevant in the legal judgement, and through omission of relating to the reality (power, financial matters, security, distribution), substituted by a general consensus about the general, ethically loaded starting point.' They conclude that, 'the ethical formulations and procedural rules may perhaps express liberation of the individual for some, but simultaneously they seem to produce rules of control and sanctions towards others' (2003: 100).

Security: from moral panic to moral crisis

In the winter of 2004, a young man caused the death of three individuals in a car accident. Evidently, the accident was due to careless driving in the populated district of Brønshøj. From the very beginning all the public media covered the accident, with detailed articles about the loss of lives, the mourning of families and friends, interviews with passers-by, questionnaires concerning the most appropriate punishment, and interviews with ministers, above all the minister of justice. Once the full extent of the tragedy became known, statements about the need for severe punishment were exchanged liberally. Eight months later the young man, whose first name was Bekim, was sentenced to three years imprisonment. According to the existing legislation the maximum sentence for this offence is one year. But in this case the jury decided to make an example of the offender. Careless driving is not acceptable in Denmark, and thus he was sentenced to three years imprisonment.

The sentence was remarkable from many points of view. Until recently, Danish courts have been recognized for their tradition of acting in accordance with Montesquieu's principle of the division of powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary (Christie 1999). Until recently Denmark has had a strong and independent class of civil servants, who have acted as a safeguard to the consequences of 'moral panics'. But now we are seeing a change in the administration of justice. Increasingly, the political class and the public media have come closer to the court. Returning there is a demand for higher penalties and for criminalizing minor offences such as drug use. It is well known that the prison is a place for hard-core, 'real' criminals, that there is no necessary link between the strictness of the punishment and the frequency of crimes, and that the prison system produces criminal characters rather than restoring inmates to normality. Yet currently we are seeing 'considerably more people behind bars compared to other Nordic countries' (Balvig 2000: 320; see also Balvig 2004).

In some important respects we are witnessing the rise of new principles similar to those of other western nations, not least the principles of 'being tough on crime' and of 'zero tolerance'. In Balvig's words (2000: 320; see also Balvig 2004), 'the penal complex of England and the United States has increasingly become a role model for the Danish prison system'. And, with the intensification of global economy, we see the rise of new surveillance technologies and private security agencies within semi-public areas such as the shopping mall. Compared to only ten years ago, a *paradigmatic shift* has taken

place. This is not only due to the change in the political landscape that occurred in November 2001, when a liberal/conservative government took power, because a change was on its way throughout the 1990s. But there is one important difference: 'Whereas the Social Democratic government justified the new measures primarily by their utility the new government appeals to the people's sense of justice and justifies the initiatives by their penal value' (Balvig 2004).

Three interrelated reasons for the shift can be identified. *First*, we see a weakening of the tradition of solutions for civil conflict and conversely increasing *estrangement*. Following the Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie (Christie 1999), Denmark has some tradition for civil conflict solutions, which as such is a sign of the existence of extensive networks of moral regulation, or 'a deep grammar of society'. An important component in Danish preventive criminology has been attempts in conciliation that have acted on strong, high-spirited social movements, their codes of morals and ideas about civil conflict solutions. During the second half of the 1960s, an increase in crime, above all the frequency of offences against property, were one of the first indications of a weakening of the social bonds of civil society. It seems that more people whose material wishes were beyond reach had committed robbery and open theft. Given full employment, why could they not take up a decent job instead? The social movements no longer offered a stable framework, a closely-knit tissue of norms and rules, to serve as basis for civil conflict solutions. In 1971 the Crime Prevention Council was established, aimed at strengthening the Danish tradition of civil conflict solutions.

Secondly, concurrently with the weakening of the social movements as intermediary bodies, we see a growing *individualism*: the single individual has come closer to the state, either as a client of the welfare state, or as a citizen with 'rights' and 'duties'. The social movements had operated on a level between the individual and the state and used to perform a whole range of important roles in society. In the late 1960s, what was new was not only the actual increase in crime, but also that it took place within those residential areas that were marked by notions of positive social control and a certain tradition of civil conflict solutions (Borch 2005: 15). The Crime Prevention Council spoke of mobilising communities through the sponsoring and facilitation of common community activities. 'These activities are described as cosy and fun, but the aim of the incitement is more serious, i.e. to empower the communities in order to mobilize the residents as guardians and thereby prevent crime' (Christensen 2005: 77). One outcome has been the foundation of a unique Danish construction, SSP co-operation, i.e. co-operation at the municipal level between the Social administration, the School, leisure organizations and the Police. Its aim is to create a network of community agents to prevent crime in the everyday lives of children and young people, and to regenerate communities in order to re-establish the social control and sense of responsibility that have been lost. These programmes are presented as 'community regenerating programmes' (Christensen 2005: 87).

Thirdly, the paradigmatic shift has a governmental *neo-liberal inflexion*, characterised by the re-emergence of aspects of the 'classical terminology': the person who commits a crime is considered a sane citizen, a situational man, an opportunist consumer, a rational individual, a criminal of choice. Therefore, we see long-term criminal preventive policies being replaced by a new 'criminology of everyday life' (Garland 2001: 160). To a greater extent, the criminal subject is perceived as a 'situational man', an opportunist consumer whose attitudes cannot readily be changed, but whose access to social goods can be barred. If

he succeeds in committing a crime, he should be sentenced in accordance with the gravity of the deed, not from the viewpoint of restitution. In Denmark, one indication of this trend is an increase in the extensive use of contract-based sanctions in place of (indeterminate) solitary confinement, and in 2001 the invention of a system of youth sanctions for criminals between 15 and 18 years of age.

It should be remembered that the neo-liberal inflexion came late to Denmark and that it has been achieved by measures of preventive criminology that are much in line with previous ones in Denmark. Previously, Danish crime prevention acted upon a tradition of civil conflict solutions promoted by the old social movements. For the moment, religious societies are called in as conciliators in cases of serious crime, but the outcome does not seem to be promoting the abolition of parallel societies with different norms and traditions of civil conflict solutions.

Hypothesis relative to the consequences to citizenship

Currently the city is being reinvented: globally the market place is on the move back into the city, and the state has a new role to play. Not only is the state supposed to be 'enframing natural processes in mechanisms of security'; now it has a leading role to play in promoting competition. For Foucault, competition is not the end result of a natural law, but a principle of formalisation, the outcome of active politics. In Denmark this neo-liberal inflexion is of a relatively recent date and it is mixed up with other philosophies. Since, as already noted, the Danish welfare regime is the result of a green- red alliance, a compromise between different interests, we see more ideas circulating about 'interests' and 'rights' to dwellings and the city.

Indeed, urban policies directed towards steering and regulating cities have witnessed a neo-liberal inflexion. Until the mid-1980s it was generally believed that compensatory policies would satisfy the legal rights of citizens for decent living standards, including modern conditions for good living. This could be in the form of rented flats in high-rise blocks or single-family detached houses, which the liberal section of the green-red alliance mainly advocated. When Copenhagen opened its doors to the global economy, the inner balance of this alliance was disturbed by selling the entire municipal housing stock. As in other countries, we see initiatives directed at the 'facilitating of access to property, especially including the low income part of the population by long term loans' (Donzelot 2006). From then on it was assumed that private ownership in any form would lead to a new entrepreneurial ethos, involving responsibility for one's private home and one's local community. HTA:

An important issue during the 1990s and onwards has been the transformation of the housing market; the overall change is one of growing social dissimilarity: Ownership housing is becoming the normal form of housing for the population in Denmark while renting is left over to marginal groups. This process is sometimes labelled residualisation or tenure polarisation (Hamnett, 1984). The outcome in UK as well as Denmark has been one of increased difference between socio-economic and ethnic status of owners and renters leading to rising segregation inside the cities.

Urban policies targeted at specific urban conditions have witnessed two departures from leading ideas about the good welfare city. *The first* took shape in the late 1970s, when planning turned its focus from the quantitative expansion of urban space to qualitative change of the existing urban environment. The urban planners gradually changed the scope of their activities from physical planning to *urban governance*, involving a participatory approach

based on a clearer understanding of the various motivations, reasoning and outcomes associated with such places. *The second* departure took place during the 1990s, when urban development became marked by increasing heterogeneity. Some cities of in western Denmark were affected by industrial stagnation, unemployment and increased expenditure on welfare, while others, including Copenhagen, had become 'post-industrialized'. In the 1990s a new type of planning ideal was born, the so-called 'negotiation planning', in which private enterprise negotiated with the municipality over mutual modifications of plans. Participation in the democratic sense of the term recedes into the background, and planners try to forget the great visions of cohesion and democracy in order to concentrate on urban planning using strict professional expertise. Once again, technology seems to have become the overall solution to the problems of civilisation. We are experiencing a revival of late nineteenth-century discourses in terms of development optimism and belief in technological solutions and architectural designs. There is therefore a paradox here.

Social policies directed at the rise of 'problematic zones' within which the poor and excluded are concentrated has had other urban effects. It is possible to speak about two phases and two different philosophies. One takes up the meaning of the local from the viewpoint of social work, networks of strong ties and civil security. During the 1990s, numerous projects for 'lifting up the quarters' were initiated by the former Ministry of Urban and Housing; we did not see the invention of new suburbs as in post-war politics, but the bettering of existing residential areas by means of a mixture of architectural renewals and social policies. From the viewpoint of civic cohesion, the task was to move towards neighbourhood empowerment through a reformulated civil society, the meaning being that the excluded and poor should regain a sense of belonging to the society in other ways than through labour market integration. PA: 'insertion, inclusion, activation were and are the key words in social intervention towards the poor'. Today we see the development of a different strategy. It is acknowledged that a local community's strong ties have disadvantages from the viewpoint of city segregation and labour market integration, as is remarked by H.T. Andersen the projects for lifting up the quarters 'never really took employment and industry on board'. Therefore, for the moment, the conditions for creating weak ties between the city's various social circles has become a new focus of attention, since it is assumed that they will improve opportunities for entering the labour market.

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